This title was first published in 2001. The problem of the subject-predicate distinction has featured centrally in much of modern philosophy of language and philosophical logic, and the distinction is taken as basic or fundamental in modern philosophical logic. Michael Durrant seeks to demonstrate that the distinction should not be taken as basic or fundamental and argues that the reason for it being held to be fundamental is a failure to acknowledge the category and role of the sortal. A sortal is a symbol which furnishes us with a principle for distinguishing and counting particulars (objects) and whick does so in its own right relying on no antecedent principle or method of so distinguishing or counting. This book explores sortals and their relationship to the subject-predicate distinction; arguing that the nature of sortal symbols has been misconstrued in much modern writing in the philosophy of logic by failing to distinguish sortals from names and predicates.
Introduction: Aims and Plan of Campaign; I: Sortals, Names and
Predicables; II: Sortals and Indentification; III: Sortals and the
Subject-Predicate Distinction; IV: General Consequences of the Failure to
Acknowledge the Category of the Sortal; V: Frege: Sortals as Concepts; VI:
Russell: Sortals as Descriptions; VII: Geach: Sortals, Substantival General
Terms and General Names; VIII: Strawson: Sortals - Failure to Recognise Their
True Nature; His Dual Position; IX: Strawson: Sortals and Sortal
Instantiation; X: Strawson: Further Consequences of Failure to Recognise the
Nature of the Sortal; XI: Quine: Sortals and Canonical Notation; Conclusion;
Postscript
Michael Durrant
