The problem of the subject-predicate distinction has featured centrally in much of modern philosophy of language and philosophical logic, and the distinction is taken as basic or fundamental in modern philosophical logic. Michael Durrant, whilst explicitly not denying that the subject-predicate distinction as a distinction is ultimate, seeks to demonstrate that the distinction should not be taken as basic or fundamental and argues that the reason for it being held to be fundamental is a failure to acknowledge the category and role of the sortal. A sortal is a symbol which furnishes us with a principle for distinguishing and counting particulars (objects) and whick does so in its own right relying on no antecedent principle or method of so distinguishing or counting. This book explores sortals and their relationship to the subject-predicate distinction; arguing that the nature of sortal symbols has been misconstrued in much modern writing in the philosophy of logic by failing to distinguish sortals from names and predicates; contending that this misconstruction has led to a failure to appreciate what makes the subject-predicate distinction possible; demonstrating logical difficulties which then follow; and expounding an account of sortal symbols which seeks to be immune from the difficulties. Exploring and challenging aspects of the work of Frege, Russell, Geach, Quine, Evans and Strawson, amongst others, Durrant also provides a challenge to certain popular presuppositions employed in many areas of contemporary philosophical debate, and offers important insights for those studying across philosophical logic, philosophy of language, and metaphysics and epistemology, in particular.
Editors Preface xi Acknowledgements xiii Introduction to the Author xv Roger Trigg Introduction: Aims and Plan of Campaign 1(1) Principal Aims 1(4) Sortals, Names, Descriptions, Predicables, Substantival General Terms, Predicates 5(4) Plan of Campaign 9(4) Sortals, Names and Predicables 13(27) Sortals: a Detailed Investigation 13(11) That Sortals are a Distinct Category of Symbol in that they are not Reducible to Names or Predicables/Predicates 24(7) Considerations on a General Thesis which may arise from the claim that Sortals are not Reducible to Predicables/Predicates 31(5) Summary of
Chapter 36(4) Sortals and Identification 40(48) The Priority of Sortal Identification over both Naming/Referring and Predication 40(1) Of the Priority of Sortal Identifying over Naming/Referring 40(3) A Case in which Referring may be taken as prior to Identifying 43(1) Consideration of a general attack on my thesis that Sortal Identification is prior to Naming/Referring 44(5) Some general arguments in favour of the thesis that Sortal Identification is prior to Describing or Predicating 49(3) The Contribution of Gareth Evans 52(1) An introduction to Evans: His concept of `Demonstrative Identification 52(1) That Sortal Identification is logically prior to Demonstrative Identification 53(1) The Case against Demonstrative Identification (1): the Misconstruction of Demonstrative Sortal Phrases 53(3) The Case against Demonstrative Identification (2): Consideration of a stronger and weaker thesis as regards its base 56(6) That Demonstrative Identification (in Evans sense) rests on, presupposes, Descriptive Identification in his sense and indeed on Sortal Identification 62(7) In that Demonstrative Identification is to be regarded as a mode of Identification, as opposed to a mode of Reference, it is reducible to Sortal Identification, in the sense of `Sortal ``Picking-Out, `Sortal ``Discrimination 69(3) Of the relationship of `Descriptive Identification to `Sortal Identification and `Predicate Identification 72(3) Summary of Conclusions from Part I and Part II 75(1) Thought and Speech 76(1) Of Evans general thesis that Identification in Thought is prior to Identification in Speech 76(12) Sortals and the Subject-Predicate Distinction 88(60) Strawsons Objections to Geachs Explanation of the Subject-Predicate Distinction 88(6) Strawsons `Mediating Criterion for the Subject-Predicate Distinction 94(8) An Attempted Account of what distinguishes an expression occurring in the role of Logical Subject 102(1) An Attempted Account of what distinguishes an expression occurring in the role of Logical Predicate 103(5) A more Precise Account of the Relation between Sortals and the Subject-Predicate Distinction 108(3) A Contrast with Quine 111(12) The Issue of a Criterion for the Subject-Predicate Distinction 123(2) An Account of the Relations between Referring, Identifying and Existence 125(11) Explanations of the Subject-Predicate Distinction in the sense of Answers to Two Questions 136(12) General Consequences of the Failure to Acknowledge the Category of the Sortal 148(11) The Attempted Reduction of Sortals to Predicates and its consequences 148(3) The consequences of failure to recognise the Sortal as a Principle of Counting and Distinction in its own right and equally those of the failure to recognise principles of Counting and Distinction in their own right formed from `Matter terms 151(2) Some Elucidations and Expansions 153(3) Summary of the General Consequences of the failure to acknowledge the Category of the Sortal 156(3) Frege: Sortals as `Concepts 159(22) That Frege fails to recognise both the definite and indefinite form of the Sortal as a Distinct and Primary Category of general symbol (expression) 159(6) Some consequences and difficulties which arise from Freges failure to recognise the Sortal as a Distinct and Primary Category of general symbol (expression) 165(4) Is Frege committed to a doctrine of absolutely simple names and correspondingly, absolutely simple particulars, as a consequence of his failure to acknowledge the Category of the Sortal? 169(12) Russell: Sortals as `Descriptions 181(13) Russells basic Categories of Symbol 181(2) That no case can be made for Russells implicit recognition of Sortals in his Theory of Descriptions 183(4) Particular Difficulties in Russells position 187(3) Consequences of Russells failure to acknowledge the Category of the Sortal 190(1) That Russell is committed to a doctrine of absolutely simple, basic Names and concomitantly to a doctrine of absolutely simple or `pure particulars 191(3) Geach: Sortals, Substantival General Terms and General Names 194(15) Geachs recognition of the category of Substantival General Term does not entail recognition of the category of the Sortal as either basic or distinctive 194(1) Geachs reduction of Substantival General Terms to Names or Predicables (Predicates) and its difficulties 195(5) Further criticisms of Geachs thesis that the introduction of Proper Names merely presupposes the introduction of Names 200(4) The disastrous Consequences of reducing Substantival General Terms and Sortals to Names or Predicables (Predicates) 204(5) Strawson: Sortals - Failure to Recognise Their True Nature; His Dual Position 209(11) The Claim that Strawson recognises the true nature of the Sortal 209(1) That Strawson regards predicate expressions as a kind of Name, Sortal expressions as predicates and hence as a kind of Name 210(5) That Strawson also treats Sortal expressions as Predicative 215(1) A Summary Statement of Strawsons `Dual Position 216(1) Some General Difficulties for Strawsons `Category criterion for the Subject-Predicate Distinction 217(3) Strawson: Sortals and Sortal Instantiation 220(9) That for Strawson one can raise the Question: `What Instances a Sortal Universal?; that Strawson is not committed to either a Doctrine of `Pure or `Relatively Pure Basic Particulars 220(5) The Case for saying that Strawson is committed to either an unintelligible and/or impossible Account or no Account of what constitutes an Instance of a Sortal 225(3) Conclusion 228(1) Strawson: Further Consequences of Failure to Recognise the Nature of the Sortal 229(27) That to treat Sortals as Predicates (indirectly) leads to the Search for a Basis for the Introduction of `Particulars in General 229(21) A Second Consequence of the Failure to recognise the Nature of the Sortal: the Search for a Basic Notion of an `Instance or Explanation of the Notion of an `Individual Instance 250(2) A Third Consequence of the Failure to recognise the Nature of the Sortal: the Search for an Underlying Basis for the Subject-Predicate Distinction in the sense of the Search for a certain type of Empirical proposition 252(4) Quine: Sortals and Canonical Notation 256(19) That Quine fails to recognise the Category of the Sortal and analyses Sortals out in favour of the Variables of Quantification and Predicates 256(7) Consequences of the Failure to recognise the Category of the Sortal 263(5) A Suggested Implication of my Thesis Rejected 268(1) Quines Aims and Claims for the Theory of Canonical Notation 269(6) Conclusion 275(5) Postscript 280(27) Stephen Horton Introduction 280(1) Theories of Reference 280(5) Formal Logic 285(3) Comparative Philosophy: The Analytic/Continental Divide 288(13) Conclusion 301(6) Bibliography 307(4) Bibliography of Other Writings 311(4) Index of Names 315
