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Statutory Interpretation: Pragmatics and Argumentation [Hardback]

(Universitą di Bologna), (Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Portugal), (University of Windsor, Ontario)
  • Formāts: Hardback, 320 pages, height x width x depth: 235x157x22 mm, weight: 630 g, Worked examples or Exercises
  • Izdošanas datums: 21-Jan-2021
  • Izdevniecība: Cambridge University Press
  • ISBN-10: 1108429343
  • ISBN-13: 9781108429344
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  • Formāts: Hardback, 320 pages, height x width x depth: 235x157x22 mm, weight: 630 g, Worked examples or Exercises
  • Izdošanas datums: 21-Jan-2021
  • Izdevniecība: Cambridge University Press
  • ISBN-10: 1108429343
  • ISBN-13: 9781108429344
Citas grāmatas par šo tēmu:
"The English word "interpretation" comes from Latin interpretatio, from interpres, originally meaning an intermediary, broker, or agent, and then also an explainer or translator (De Vaan 2008, 307). In its turn interpres seems to have resulted from the fusion of inter (between) and praes, a word that possibly shares the same root with the Latin pretium (price), thus being linked to the idea of an economic exchange (lending, buying, or selling). The semantic area of "interpretation" is also covered by terms of Greek origin, such as "exegesis" and "hermeneutics," often used in religious contexts. In Latin, intepretatio was used normally as a synonym for translation (McElduff 2009), considered both as transposing a text into a different language and as explaining the meaning of a text to one who does not understand it (Cicero De Legibus, 1.14.9). However, interpretatio was also used in a broader sense, for referring to the activity of interpreting "laws, dreams and omens as well as languages, though the notion of transferring information of one sort or another from person to person or from god to person is always key to its usage" (McElduff 2009, 136). In the medieval dialectical tradition, and in particular in Abelard, interpretatio was a technical term. It was used for the activity of explaining the meaning of a word completely unknown, such as (normally) a foreign word (Abaelardus Dialectica, 583-584), in particular, by reference to word's etymology, or to the analysis of its component morphemes (Abaelardus Dialectica, 340)"--

Drawing on linguistics, legal theory, computing, and dialectics, this book analyzes statutory interpretation in terms of arguments used in everyday reasoning. The authors illustrate complex, crucial legal cases with diagrams and summarize them in schemes, making the methodology accessible to scholars, professionals, and students across disciplines.

Statutory interpretation involves the reconstruction of the meaning of a legal statement when it cannot be considered as accepted or granted. This phenomenon needs to be considered not only from the legal and linguistic perspective, but also from the argumentative one - which focuses on the strategies for defending a controversial or doubtful viewpoint. This book draws upon linguistics, legal theory, computing, and dialectics to present an argumentation-based approach to statutory interpretation. By translating and summarizing the existing legal interpretative canons into eleven patterns of natural arguments - called argumentation schemes - the authors offer a system of argumentation strategies for developing, defending, assessing, and attacking an interpretation. Illustrated through major cases from both common and civil law, this methodology is summarized in diagrams and maps for application to computer sciences. These visuals help make the structures, strategies, and vulnerabilities of legal reasoning accessible to both legal professionals and laypeople.

Recenzijas

'The authors do not assume extensive prior knowledge of the five varied disciplines that the work integrates, defining key concepts as needed and pointing out relevant areas of controversy in the literature This work will be of primary interest to researchers in artificial intelligence and law, statutory interpretation, argumentation theory, and pragmatics.' Emily Da Silva, Canadian Law Library Review

Papildus informācija

Combining pragmatics, dialectics, analytics, and legal theory, this work translates interpretative canons into patterns of natural argument.
List of Figures
xii
List of Tables
xiii
Acknowledgments xiv
Introduction 1(16)
1 Interpretation and Statutory Interpretation
17(38)
1.1 The Idea of Interpretation
17(1)
1.2 Interpretations Outside of the Law
18(4)
1.2.1 Interpretation in Science
18(1)
1.2.2 Interpretations of Intentional Systems
19(1)
1.2.3 Interpretation in Communication
20(1)
1.2.4 Interpretation in Art
21(1)
1.3 Legal Interpretation
22(5)
1.3.1 The Object of Legal Interpretation
22(1)
1.3.2 The Practical Significance of Legislative Interpretation
23(1)
1.3.3 Legal Interpretation and Legal Decision
24(2)
1.3.4 Descriptive and Evaluative Interpretative Assertions
26(1)
1.4 The Scope of Legal Interpretation
27(11)
1.4.1 Interpretation and Understanding
28(2)
1.4.2 Interpretation and Construction
30(2)
1.4.3 Legal Construction and Creation of New Law
32(2)
1.4.4 Conclusion on Understanding, Interpretation, and Construction
34(1)
1.4.5 Interpretation and Semantics
35(1)
1.4.6 Cognitive and Decisional Interpretation
36(2)
1.5 Reasons in Interpretation: From Texts to Purposes and Values
38(6)
1.5.1 Reasons and Motives for Interpretation
38(1)
1.5.2 Reasons for Interpretations
39(1)
1.5.3 The Semantics of Words and their Combinations
40(1)
1.5.4 The Historical Context in Which the Legislative Text Was Adopted
41(1)
1.5.5 Coherence with Other Norms, and with the Purposes of the Norm and of the Systems
42(2)
1.6 Argument Schemes in Legal Interpretation
44(8)
1.6.1 Tarello's List of Interpretative Arguments
45(1)
1.6.2 MacCormick and Summers
46(1)
1.6.3 Balkin's List of Interpretative Arguments
47(1)
1.6.4 The Legislator's Intention
48(1)
1.6.5 Criteria for Comparing Interpretative Arguments
49(1)
1.6.6 Rationales for Interpretative Canons
50(2)
References
52(2)
Cases Cited
54(1)
2 Statutory Interpretation as Problem Solving
55(42)
2.1 Introduction
55(2)
2.2 Interpretation as Decision Making
57(3)
2.3 The Fire Engine Example
60(6)
2.3.1 The Arguments of the Fire Engine Example
60(2)
2.3.2 Mapping the Fire Engine Example
62(4)
2.4 Problem Solving
66(4)
2.4.1 The Notion of Problem Solving
66(2)
2.4.2 Problem Solving in Computer Science
68(1)
2.4.3 Cooperative Problem Solving
69(1)
2.5 Deliberation Dialogue
70(2)
2.6 A Simple Example of Problem Solving
72(2)
2.7 An Argumentation Model of Problem Solving
74(1)
2.8 Applying the Model to a Legal Case
75(15)
2.8.1 The Decision-Making Process
76(3)
2.8.2 The Decision-Making Arguments
79(4)
2.8.3 The Argumentative Structure of the Dialectical Decision-Making Process
83(7)
2.9 The Purpose of the Law and Relevance
90(2)
2.10 Conclusions
92(1)
References
92(4)
Cases Cited
96(1)
3 Interpretation and Pragmatics -- Legal Ambiguity
97(60)
3.1 Introduction. Ambiguity and Interpretation
97(13)
3.1.1 Interpretation
97(3)
3.1.2 The Meanings of Ambiguity
100(3)
3.1.3 Interpretation and the Blurred Notion of Ordinary Meaning
103(3)
3.1.4 Ambiguity and Vagueness
106(4)
3.2 Syntactic Ambiguity
110(16)
3.2.1 Pragmatics and the Rules of Grammar
110(3)
3.2.2 Syntactic Ambiguity and Interpretative Disputes
113(6)
3.2.3 Inferences and Syntactic Ambiguity
119(2)
3.2.4 Disambiguation in the Housing Example
121(1)
3.2.5 Mapping Presumptions and Arguments in the Housing Example
122(4)
3.3 Syntactic and Semantic Ambiguity in Heller
126(13)
3.3.1 The Sources of the Dispute
126(2)
3.3.2 The Pragmatic Dimension of the "Ordinary Meaning" of the Second Amendment
128(1)
3.3.3 The Interpretative Arguments in Heller
129(7)
3.3.4 The Missing Dimension of the "Original Meaning"
136(3)
3.4 Semantic Ambiguity in Muscarello v. United States
139(10)
3.4.1 The "Linguistic" Arguments
139(4)
3.4.2 Argumentative Inferences in Muscarello
143(6)
3.5 Conclusion
149(2)
References
151(5)
Cases Cited
156(1)
4 Pragmatic Maxims and Presumptions in Legal Interpretation
157(48)
4.1 Introduction
157(2)
4.2 A Pragmatics of Legal Interpretation: Is It Theoretically Possible?
159(6)
4.3 Pragmatics and Argumentation Theory in Statutory Interpretation
165(4)
4.3.1 Interpretation as Argumentative Reasoning
165(1)
4.3.2 The Pragmatics of Legal Interpretation
166(2)
4.3.3 Where Pragmatics and Argumentation Meet: Inference to the Best Interpretation
168(1)
4.4 Prima Facie and Deliberative Interpretative Reasoning
169(2)
4.5 The Pragmatics of Interpretation
171(1)
4.6 Reasoning from Best Interpretation and Argumentation Schemes
172(4)
4.7 The Function of the Conversational Maxims in Implicatures
176(2)
4.8 Legal Interpretation and the Heuristics Underlying Generalized Implicatures
178(3)
4.9 The Maxims in Legal Interpretation
181(8)
4.9.1 Maxims and Interpretative Arguments
182(5)
4.9.2 Maxims, Arguments, and Presumptions on Interpretation
187(2)
4.10 Presumptions and the Purpose of the Law
189(5)
4.10.1 The Purpose of the Law as a Presumption
189(2)
4.10.2 Ordering Interpretative Presumptions
191(3)
4.11 Types of Intentions and Levels of Presumptions
194(3)
4.11.1 Types and Levels of Presumptions
194(2)
4.11.2 Types and Levels of Presumptions in Statutory Interpretation
196(1)
4.12 Conclusion
197(2)
References
199(5)
Cases Cited
204(1)
5 Arguments of Statutory Interpretation and Argumentation Schemes
205(75)
5.1 Introduction
205(1)
5.2 Interpretation and Its Arguments
206(5)
5.3 Argumentation Schemes
211(3)
5.4 A Contrario Argument
214(3)
5.5 Arguments from Analogy
217(17)
5.5.1 Problems of Analogy in Law
218(2)
5.5.2 The Structure of Analogical Arguments (Additive Analogy)
220(6)
5.5.3 Analogia Legis (Argument from Written Law)
226(1)
5.5.4 Analogia Iuris (Argument from General Principles)
227(1)
5.5.5 Analogies and Precedents
228(2)
5.5.6 Interpretative Analogical Arguments: Ejusdem Generis and Noscitur a Sociis
230(4)
5.6 A Particular Analogical Argument: The a Fortiori Argument
234(3)
5.7 Arguments from Authority
237(8)
5.7.1 Psychological Argument (Intention of the Actual Legislator)
238(3)
5.7.2 Historical Argument (Presumption of Continuity or Conservative Legislator)
241(1)
5.7.3 Authoritative Argument (Ab Exemplo)
242(1)
5.7.4 Appeal to Popular Opinion: Naturalistic Argument
243(2)
5.8 Arguments from Consequences
245(7)
5.8.1 Reductio ad Absurdum
245(3)
5.8.2 Equitative Argument
248(1)
5.8.3 Ancillary Argument: Argument from Coherence of the Law
249(1)
5.8.4 Economic Argument
250(2)
5.9 Practical Reasoning and Teleological Argument
252(2)
5.10 The Logical Role of Definitions - The Argument from Classification
254(6)
5.10.1 Reasoning from Rules
255(1)
5.10.2 Reasoning from Classification
256(1)
5.10.3 Defeasibility Conditions of Argument from Classification
257(3)
5.11 Abductive Arguments
260(11)
5.11.1 Ordinary and Technical Meaning Arguments
262(3)
5.11.2 Systematic Argument
265(5)
5.11.3 Ancillary Argument: Argument from Completeness of the Law
270(1)
5.12 Conclusion
271(1)
References
272(7)
Cases Cited
279(1)
6 Classification and Formalization of Interpretative Schemes
280
6.1 Introduction
280(1)
6.2 Interpretative Arguments
281(9)
6.2.1 Classifying Interpretative Arguments
282(1)
6.2.2 The Association between Language and Meaning
283(2)
6.2.3 Common Template
285(1)
6.2.4 Positive Uses of Interpretative Schemes
286(2)
6.2.5 Negative Uses of Interpretative Schemes
288(2)
6.3 Attacking, Questioning, and Defending Interpretative Arguments
290(26)
6.3.1 From Critical Questions to Counterarguments in Formal Argumentation Systems
290(2)
6.3.2 Argument Graphs in Carneades
292(2)
6.3.3 The Education Grants Example: Modeling Judicial Interpretation
294(7)
6.3.4 The Dunnachie Example: Fitting Interpretative Schemes to Cases
301(15)
6.4 The Logic of Interpretative Arguments
316(5)
6.4.1 Interpretative Canons as Defeasible Rules
316(3)
6.4.2 Defeat Relations: Rebutting and Undercutting
319(1)
6.4.3 An Extension-Based Argumentation Semantics
319(2)
6.5 Formal Dialectical Structure of Interpretative Arguments
321(3)
6.5.1 The Structure of an Interpretative Argument
321(1)
6.5.2 The Dialectic of Interpretative Argument: Rebutting and Undercutting
321(2)
6.5.3 Preference Arguments over Interpretative Arguments
323(1)
6.6 From Best Interpretations to Individual Claims
324(3)
6.7 Conclusions
327(2)
References
329(2)
Cases Cited
331
Douglas Walton is a world-renowned scholar in the field of argumentation. Over his career, he authored or co-authored over fifty books and over 400 refereed journal articles. His work is interdisciplinary in style and is regarded by scholars and professionals as seminal in the field. Fabrizio Macagno is Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Communication, Instituto de Filosofia da Nova (FCSH, NOVA). He has published several papers and books on definition, emotive language, presupposition, argumentation schemes, and dialogue theory, including Argumentation Schemes (Cambridge, 2008). He has also worked as a consultant in forensic linguistics at the Martinez and Novebaci Law Firm. Giovanni Sartor is Professor in Legal Informatics at the University of Bologna and Professor in Legal Informatics and Legal Theory at the European University Institute, Florence. He holds an ERC-advanced grant (2018) for the project Compulaw, and has published widely in legal philosophy, computational logic, legislation technique, and computer law. Professor Sartor is co-director of the Artificial Intelligence and Law Journal and co-editor of the Ratio Juris Journal.