Acknowledgments |
|
ix | |
Introduction |
|
1 | (12) |
|
I.1 What Is Epistemology? |
|
|
1 | (6) |
|
I.2 Overview of the Book's Themes |
|
|
7 | (5) |
|
|
12 | (1) |
1 The Regress Problem |
|
13 | (34) |
|
1.1 Introduction: A Thought Experiment |
|
|
13 | (7) |
|
1.2 Infinitism and the Regress Problem |
|
|
20 | (2) |
|
1.3 Objections to Infinitism |
|
|
22 | (7) |
|
|
29 | (6) |
|
|
35 | (4) |
|
1.6 Objections to Foundationalism |
|
|
39 | (6) |
|
|
45 | (1) |
|
|
46 | (1) |
2 Perception |
|
47 | (31) |
|
|
47 | (2) |
|
2.2 How to Stop an Epistemic Regress |
|
|
49 | (3) |
|
2.3 How to Talk about Experience |
|
|
52 | (4) |
|
2.4 Are We Ever Directly Aware of External Objects? |
|
|
56 | (3) |
|
2.5 Against Naive Realism |
|
|
59 | (2) |
|
2.6 Evaluating Indirect Realism |
|
|
61 | (5) |
|
2.7 The Return of Direct Realism |
|
|
66 | (4) |
|
2.8 Does Experience Provide Us with Reasons to Believe? |
|
|
70 | (4) |
|
2.9 Conclusion: Choosing a View |
|
|
74 | (3) |
|
|
77 | (1) |
3 The A Priori |
|
78 | (45) |
|
|
78 | (3) |
|
3.2 Negative Characterizations of A Priori Justification |
|
|
81 | (8) |
|
3.3 In What Sense Is A Priori Justification "Independent" of Experience? |
|
|
89 | (9) |
|
3.4 Positive Characterizations of A Priori Justification |
|
|
98 | (1) |
|
3.5 Bealer on the A Priori |
|
|
98 | (5) |
|
3.6 BonJour on the A Priori |
|
|
103 | (2) |
|
3.7 Is There A Priori Justification? |
|
|
105 | (1) |
|
3.8 Quine's Attack on the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction and Its Significance |
|
|
106 | (5) |
|
3.9 Against the Reliability of Intuitions |
|
|
111 | (7) |
|
3.10 Rationalism and Skepticism |
|
|
118 | (4) |
|
|
122 | (1) |
4 Inference |
|
123 | (35) |
|
|
123 | (3) |
|
4.2 Inference and the Scope of our Knowledge |
|
|
126 | (2) |
|
4.3 The Problem of Induction |
|
|
128 | (6) |
|
|
134 | (1) |
|
4.5 A Pragmatic Justification |
|
|
134 | (3) |
|
4.6 No Justification? No Problem! |
|
|
137 | (3) |
|
4.7 Deductive Reasoning and Closure |
|
|
140 | (3) |
|
|
143 | (3) |
|
4.9 In Defense of Closure |
|
|
146 | (2) |
|
|
148 | (9) |
|
|
157 | (1) |
5 On Knowing the Truth |
|
158 | (24) |
|
|
158 | (1) |
|
|
159 | (2) |
|
|
161 | (3) |
|
|
164 | (2) |
|
|
166 | (8) |
|
|
174 | (4) |
|
5.7 What If There Is No Analysis? |
|
|
178 | (3) |
|
|
181 | (1) |
|
|
181 | (1) |
6 Memory |
|
182 | (33) |
|
|
182 | (1) |
|
6.2 Awareness of the Past |
|
|
183 | (5) |
|
|
188 | (12) |
|
6.4 Memory and the Justification of Belief |
|
|
200 | (6) |
|
6.5 Justifying Our Reliance on Memory |
|
|
206 | (3) |
|
6.6 The Problem of Easy Knowledge |
|
|
209 | (5) |
|
|
214 | (1) |
|
|
214 | (1) |
7 Testimony |
|
215 | (46) |
|
|
215 | (5) |
|
7.2 Reductionism and Non-Reductionism |
|
|
220 | (18) |
|
7.3 Testimony and Transmission |
|
|
238 | (12) |
|
7.4 Caveat Emptor? On the Speaker's Responsibilities |
|
|
250 | (4) |
|
|
254 | (3) |
|
|
257 | (3) |
|
|
260 | (1) |
8 Kinds of Knowledge |
|
261 | (38) |
|
|
261 | (1) |
|
8.2 Knowing-How and Knowing-That |
|
|
262 | (20) |
|
8.3 Is Understanding a Species of Knowledge? |
|
|
282 | (8) |
|
8.4 Animal and Reflective Knowledge |
|
|
290 | (8) |
|
|
298 | (1) |
9 Internalism vs. Externalism |
|
299 | (34) |
|
|
299 | (5) |
|
9.2 An Early Argument for Externalism |
|
|
304 | (3) |
|
9.3 Objections to Reliabilism and/or Externalism |
|
|
307 | (17) |
|
9.4 Arguments for Externalism |
|
|
324 | (7) |
|
|
331 | (1) |
|
|
332 | (1) |
10 The Ethics of Belief |
|
333 | (26) |
|
|
333 | (1) |
|
10.2 Plantinga's Peritrope |
|
|
334 | (3) |
|
10.3 The Costs and Benefits of Ungrounded Belief |
|
|
337 | (8) |
|
|
345 | (6) |
|
10.5 Ethics and Epistemology |
|
|
351 | (4) |
|
|
355 | (3) |
|
|
358 | (1) |
11 Skepticism |
|
359 | (36) |
|
|
359 | (2) |
|
11.2 An Argument for Radical Skepticism |
|
|
361 | (4) |
|
|
365 | (6) |
|
|
371 | (3) |
|
11.5 The Explanationist Reply |
|
|
374 | (8) |
|
11.6 A Contextualist Solution |
|
|
382 | (5) |
|
11.7 Darker Demonology: Schaffer's Demon |
|
|
387 | (4) |
|
|
391 | (3) |
|
|
394 | (1) |
References |
|
395 | (20) |
Index |
|
415 | |