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War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency - RAND Counterinsurgency Study Final Report [Mīkstie vāki]

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  • Formāts: Paperback / softback, 520 pages, height x width x depth: 230x160x30 mm, weight: 812 g, Illustrations (some col.)
  • Izdošanas datums: 13-Mar-2008
  • Izdevniecība: RAND
  • ISBN-10: 0833043099
  • ISBN-13: 9780833043092
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War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency - RAND Counterinsurgency Study Final ReportPalielināt
  • Formāts: Paperback / softback, 520 pages, height x width x depth: 230x160x30 mm, weight: 812 g, Illustrations (some col.)
  • Izdošanas datums: 13-Mar-2008
  • Izdevniecība: RAND
  • ISBN-10: 0833043099
  • ISBN-13: 9780833043092
Citas grāmatas par šo tēmu:
Permanent link: https://www.kriso.lv/db/9780833043092.html
Keywords:
Examines how the United States should improve its counterinsurgency (COIN) capabilities through, for example, much greater focus on understanding jihadist strategy, using civil measures to strengthen the local government, and enabling local forces to conduct COIN operations. Provides a broad discussion of the investments, organizational changes, and multilateral arrangements that the United States should pursue to improve its COIN capabilities.
Preface iii
Figures
xvii
Tables
xix
Summary xxiii
Acknowledgments lix
Abbreviations lxi
PART I: THE CHALLENGE
Defining the Problem
1(22)
GWOT or COIN?
1(13)
The Globalization of Insurgency and COIN
14(3)
The Untidy and Dynamic World of COIN
17(2)
What to Expect from This Report
19(4)
Framing the Problem
23(26)
A Planning Construct
23(1)
Types of Insurgency
23(9)
Type I---Local Insurgency
25(1)
Type II---Local-International Insurgency
26(1)
Type III---Global-Local Insurgency
27(1)
Type IV---Global Insurgency
28(4)
Aspects of COIN
32(8)
Understanding
32(1)
Shaping
33(2)
Acting
35(1)
Timing: Understanding, Shaping, and Acting Over the Lifetime of Insurgency
36(4)
COIN Capabilities
40(9)
Territorial
40(1)
Structural
41(1)
Kinetic
42(1)
Informational
43(1)
Cognitive
44(5)
Countering Type III Insurgency
49(26)
The Main Threat
49(9)
COIN Challenges from Type III Insurgencies
58(4)
The Paradox of Force
62(5)
Achieving Legitimacy and Security While Reducing Reliance on Deadly Force
67(8)
Part II: Complete and Balanced Capabilities
Overview of Capabilities Needed to Counter Type III Insurgency
75(12)
Timely Civil COIN
76(2)
The Power of Information
78(3)
Improving Local Forces
81(2)
A Change in Emphasis for U.S. Military Forces
83(4)
Civil Capabilities
87(36)
Introduction
87(2)
Competition in the Civil Realm
89(1)
Strategies to Meet the Challenges of Type III Insurgency
90(3)
Carrot-and-Stick
90(1)
Hearts-and-Minds
91(1)
Transformation
92(1)
Integrating the Three Strategies to Counter Type III Insurgency
93(2)
Expertise and Resources in Functional Areas
95(2)
Coordinated Participation of Multiple Organizations
97(3)
The Host Nation
98(1)
The U.S. Government
98(1)
Other Governments
99(1)
International Organizations
99(1)
Nongovernmental Organizations
100(1)
Guiding Principles for Implementing a Strategy
100(3)
Coordinate Civil and Military Efforts
100(1)
Start Early
101(2)
Manage Expectations
103(1)
Current Efforts
103(2)
Capabilities: How Ready Is the United States to Conduct Civil COIN?
105(11)
Nature of the Quantitative Analysis
106(2)
The Necessary Operational Culture is Lacking
108(2)
Current Numbers of Personnel Are Too Low
110(3)
Fiscal Resources Are Insufficient
113(3)
Thinking About Future Capabilities
116(4)
Illustrative Scenario 1: ``The Big One''
116(1)
Illustrative Scenario 2: Two ``Mediums''
117(1)
Illustrative Scenario 3: Two ``Mediums'' Plus Prevention
117(3)
The Security Problem
120(1)
Conclusion
121(2)
Information Capabilities
123(38)
Information as a Strategic Resource
123(3)
Putting Users First in Setting and Meeting Information Requirements
126(7)
Getting Information
133(11)
Promoting a Cell Phone Society
133(4)
National Registry-Census, ID Cards, and Vetting
137(2)
Three-Dimensional Awareness
139(1)
Embedded Video
140(1)
National Wiki
141(1)
Enabling Information Users to Be Productive Information Providers
142(2)
ICON
144(7)
How Much Difference Would ICON Make?
151(1)
An ICONic Vignette
152(3)
Feasibility and Implementation
155(6)
Perception and Cognition
161(14)
Influencing Opinion
161(7)
From Information Power to Brain Power
168(1)
Cognitive Capabilities for COIN
169(3)
Conclusion
172(3)
General Security Capabilities
175(28)
Rethinking Basic Requirements
175(3)
Core Security Capabilities
178(20)
Institutional Management Capacity
179(2)
Uniformed Command and Leadership
181(1)
Logistics
182(1)
IO Capabilities and Competence
183(1)
Justice Systems
184(1)
Police and Law Enforcement
185(2)
Constabulary Police
187(1)
Technical Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
188(1)
Human Intelligence
189(1)
Border Security
190(1)
Coastal Security
191(1)
Tactical Air Mobility
191(1)
Long-Range Air Mobility
192(1)
Specialized Forces for High-Value Targets (HVTs)
193(1)
Precision Strike
194(1)
Ground Combat
194(4)
The Relationship of Local and Foreign Capabilities
198(5)
Local Security Capabilities
203(14)
Factors Affecting Local Capability
203(6)
Timing
204(1)
Insurgent Strength
205(3)
Initial Condition of the Local Government
208(1)
Priorities for Local Security Capabilities
209(5)
Real-World Obstacles
214(3)
U.S. Security Capabilities
217(32)
Building for Success; Hedging Against Disappointment
217(1)
Building for Success
218(15)
Three U.S. Missions: Prepare, Enable, Operate
218(5)
Requirements for Preparing, Enabling, and Operating
223(5)
Deficient U.S. Capabilities
228(5)
Hedging Against Disappointment
233(8)
Training and Education
238(1)
Nonlethal Force Options
239(1)
Land Mobility
240(1)
Inclusive, Integrated, User-Based Networks for Sharing and Collaboration
240(1)
Sustainable Ground Operations
240(1)
U.S. Ground Forces---Better or Bigger?
241(6)
Conclusion
247(2)
PART III: ORGANIZING AND INVESTING
Multilateral Counterinsurgency
249(30)
The Case for Multilateral COIN
249(2)
The Content of Multilateral COIN Capabilities
251(5)
Preparing for Multilateral COIN
256(5)
The NATO-EU Model
261(3)
The Non-NATO Model
264(2)
Conducting Multilateral COIN
266(3)
Multilateral COIN Campaign Models
269(3)
Functions, Principles, and Options
272(4)
Political Authority, Strategy-Setting, and Policymaking
273(1)
Campaign Oversight
274(1)
Command, Control, and Collaboration in Security Operations
274(1)
Local Cooperation
275(1)
Information
275(1)
Politics
276(3)
Investment Priorities
279(24)
The Need to Invest
279(2)
Setting Investment Priorities
281(6)
Planning High-Priority Investments
287(8)
Investing for an Uncertain Future
295(2)
Costs
297(4)
Conclusion
301(2)
Organization: Unsettled Structures for Unsettled Times
303(44)
Organizational Issues in Perspective
303(4)
Capability Gaps and Organizational Implications
307(9)
Justice and Police
309(2)
Building Local Security Institutional Capacity
311(2)
Organizing, Training, Equipping, and Advising Foreign Armed Forces
313(1)
Employment Impact
314(1)
Mass Public Education
314(2)
Macro-Structural Considerations
316(8)
Government Option 1: Business-as-Usual
318(2)
Government Option 2: Install a COIN Czar
320(2)
Government Option 3: Create a COIN Agency
322(2)
Defense COIN Options
324(14)
Defense Option 1: Business-as-Usual
326(1)
Defense Option 2: Expand the Scope and Size of U.S. SOCOM
327(3)
Defense Option 3: Assign COIN as a Principal Mission of Regular Forces
330(5)
Defense Option 4: Create a Defense Security Agency
335(3)
Summary
338(1)
Micro-Structural Considerations
339(8)
Implications and Recommendations
347(94)
Definitions Matter
347(4)
Complete and Balanced COIN Capabilities
351(3)
Will It Really Work?
354(3)
Implementation Strategy
357(8)
Investment
357(2)
Organization
359(1)
Harnessing Information Power
360(1)
Multilateral COIN
361(2)
Engendering Local Responsibility
363(2)
Getting Started: Specific Recommendations for Immediate Attention
365(3)
Civil COIN
366(1)
Information and Cognition
366(1)
Local Security Services
367(1)
U.S. Forces
367(1)
Multilateral
368(1)
Organization
368(1)
Conclusion
368(5)
Appendixes
Eighty-Nine Insurgencies: Outcomes and Endings
373(24)
Multilateral COIN Capacity
397(34)
Indicators and Warnings
431(8)
Ground-Force Tasks and Improvements
439(2)
About the RAND COIN Team 441(4)
Works Cited 445