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Water, Electricity, and the Poor: Who Benefits from Utility Subsidies? [Mīkstie vāki]

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  • Formāts: Paperback / softback, 300 pages, height x width x depth: 228x154x19 mm, weight: 496 g
  • Izdošanas datums: 30-Oct-2005
  • Izdevniecība: World Bank Publications
  • ISBN-10: 0821363425
  • ISBN-13: 9780821363423
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  • Cena: 28,70 €
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Water, Electricity, and the Poor: Who Benefits from Utility Subsidies?Palielināt
  • Formāts: Paperback / softback, 300 pages, height x width x depth: 228x154x19 mm, weight: 496 g
  • Izdošanas datums: 30-Oct-2005
  • Izdevniecība: World Bank Publications
  • ISBN-10: 0821363425
  • ISBN-13: 9780821363423
Citas grāmatas par šo tēmu:
Permanent link: https://www.kriso.lv/db/9780821363423.html
Keywords:
While consumer utility subsidies are widespread in both the water and electricity sectors, their effectiveness in reaching and distributing resources to the poor is the subject of much debate. Water, Electricity, and the Poor brings together empirical evidence on subsidy performance across a wide range of countries. It documents the prevalence of consumer subsidies, provides a typology of the many variants found in the developing world, and presents a number of indicators useful in assessing the degree to which such subsidies benefit the poor, focusing on three key concepts: beneficiary incidence, benefit incidence, and materiality. The findings on subsidy performance will be useful to policy makers, utility regulators, and sector practitioners who are contemplating introducing, eliminating, or modifying utility subsidies, and to those who view consumer utility subsidies as a social protection instrument.
Foreword xiii
Acknowledgments xv
Abbreviations and Acronyms xvi
1 Introduction
1(7)
Infrastructure Services Are Important to Economies and Households
2(1)
Many Still Lack Access to Improved Water and Electricity Services
3(1)
Are Subsidies the Answer?
4(1)
Utility Subsidies Are Also Redistributive Mechanisms
5(1)
Objective of This Book: Assessing the Targeting Performance of Subsidies
5(3)
2 A Typology of Consumer Utility Subsidies
8(28)
What Types of Consumer Utility Subsidies Exist?
8(6)
How Are Subsidies Funded?
14(5)
How Prevalent Are Different Types of Subsidies?
19(11)
Why Are Subsidies So Prevalent?
30(4)
Summary.
34(2)
3 The Rationale for Subsidizing Services for the Poor
36(16)
Subsidies Are Instruments of Sectoral Policy
36(10)
Utilities Subsidies Are Also Instruments of Broader Social Policy
46(5)
Summary
51(1)
4 The Determinants of Targeting Performance: A Conceptual Framework
52(18)
Data and Methodology
52(4)
Conceptual Framework: The Determinants of Subsidy Performance
56(11)
Summary
67(3)
5 The Targeting Performance of Quantity-Based Subsidies
70(22)
A Snapshot of Performance: Quantity-Targeted Subsidies Are Regressive
70(4)
The Access Handicap: Only Connected Households Are Potential Beneficiaries
74(3)
Metering: A Necessary Condition for Quantity Targeting
77(2)
Targeting Potential: Do the Poor Consume Less Than the Rich?
79(6)
Beneficiary Targeting in Practice: No One Is Excluded
85(1)
Benefit Targeting in Practice: High-Volume Consumers Receive Larger Subsidies
86(3)
Summary
89(3)
6 Can the Targeting Performance of Consumption Subsidies Be Improved?
92(30)
Improvement of Subsidy Performance by Modifying Tariff Design?
92(6)
Beyond Quantity Targeting: Can Subsidy Performance Be Improved with Administrative Selection?
98(16)
Beyond Private Connections: How Do Alternative Forms of Consumption Subsidies Perform?
114(6)
Summary
120(2)
7 The Targeting Performance of Connection Subsidies
122(14)
Universal Connection Subsidies: Subsidy Performance If All Who Could Benefit Actually Did
124(1)
Targeted Connection Subsidies: Can Performance Be Improved?
125(2)
Assumptions in the Simulations: Will They Hold in Practice?
127(5)
Subsidy Funding and Implementation: How Do They Affect Distributional Incidence?
132(2)
Summary
134(2)
8 Consumer Utility Subsidies as Instruments of Social Policy
136(15)
What Is the Benefit Targeting Performance of Utility Subsidies Relative to Other Transfer Mechanisms?
136(4)
What Is the Distribution of Subsidy Benefits Relative to Income?
140(3)
Do Subsidies Provide Material Benefits for Poor Recipients?
143(2)
To What Extent Do Subsidies Contribute to Poverty Reduction?
145(2)
Summary
147(4)
9 Beyond Subsidies—Other Means of Achieving Sectoral Goals
151(14)
Cost Reduction Measures: Bringing Down the Cost Recovery Threshold?
152(3)
Billing and Payment Systems: Matching the Cash Flow of the Poor?
155(3)
Legal and Administrative Barriers: What Removing Nonprice Obstacles Does to Serving the Poor
158(4)
Summary
162(3)
10 Conclusions 165(8)
How Prevalent Are Utility Subsidies?
165(1)
How Do Standard Quantity-Targeted Utility Subsidies Perform?
166(1)
Why Do Quantity-Targeted Utility Subsidies Perform So Poorly?
167(1)
Do Quantity-Targeted Subsidies Perform Differently for Water and Electricity?
167(1)
Is It Possible to Improve the Design of Quantity-Targeted Subsidies?
168(1)
Are the Alternatives to Quantity Targeting Any Better?
168(1)
Do Connection Subsidies Perform Better Than Consumption Subsidies?
169(1)
Do These Conclusions Vary across Geographical Regions?
170(1)
Are Utility Subsidies as Effective as Other Measures of Social Protection?
171(1)
Do Utility Subsidies Have a Material Impact on Disposable Incomes?
171(1)
Are There Viable Alternatives to Utility Subsidies?
171(2)
Appendixes 173(91)
Appendix A: Case Background
173(11)
Appendix B: Electricity: Coverage, Expenditure, and Consumption
184(11)
Appendix C: Water: Coverage, Expenditure, and Consumption
195(13)
Appendix D: Electricity: Consumption Subsidy Data
208(18)
Appendix E: Water: Consumption Subsidy Data
226(18)
Appendix F: Water: Connection Subsidy Data
244(6)
Appendix G: Burden Limit: Consumption Subsidy Data
250(3)
Appendix H: Increasing Block Tariff Structures
253(11)
Bibliography 264(11)
Index 275