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E-grāmata: Web and Internet Economics: 13th International Conference, WINE 2017, Bangalore, India, December 17-20, 2017, Proceedings

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This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed proceedings of the

13th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2017,

held in Bangalore, India, in December 2017.
The 28 full and 6 short papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected

from 89 submissions. The papers reflect the work of researchers in theoretical
computer science, artificial intelligence, and microeconomics who have joined

forces to tackle problems at the intersection of computation, game theory and

economics.

On Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Symmetric Submodular Objectives
1(15)
Georgios Amanatidis
Georgios Birmpas
Evangelos Markakis
Don't Be Greedy: Leveraging Community Structure to Find High Quality Seed Sets for Influence Maximization
16(14)
Rico Angell
Grant Schoenebeck
Information Retention in Heterogeneous Majority Dynamics
30(14)
Vincenzo Auletta
Loannis Caragiannis
Diodato Ferraioli
Clemente Galdi
Giuseppe Persiano
The Strategy of Experts for Repeated Predictions
44(14)
Amir Ban
Yossi Azar
Yishay Mansour
Shapley Facility Location Games
58(16)
Omer Ben-Porat
Moshe Tennenholtz
Coordination Mechanisms, Cost-Sharing, and Approximation Algorithms for Scheduling
74(14)
Ioannis Caragiannis
Vasilis Gkatzelis
Cosimo Vinci
A Dynamics for Advertising on Networks
88(15)
L. Elisa Celis
Mina Dalirrooyfard
Nisheeth K. Vishnoi
Limiting User's Sybil Attack in Resource Sharing
103(17)
Zhou Chen
Yukun Cheng
Xiaotie Deng
Qi Qi
Xiang Yan
Mechanism Design with Efficiency and Equality Considerations
120(13)
Zhou Chen
Qi Qi
Changjun Wang
Wenwei Wang
The Asymptotic Behavior of the Price of Anarchy
133(13)
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi
Roberto Cominetti
Panayotis Mertikopoulos
Marco Scarsini
Fixed Price Approximability of the Optimal Gain from Trade
146(15)
Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi
Paul Goldberg
Bart de Keijzer
Stefano Leonardi
Stefano Turchetta
On Strong Equilibria and Improvement Dynamics in Network Creation Games
161(16)
Tomasz Janus
Bart de Keijzer
Sequential Deliberation for Social Choice
177(14)
Brandon Fain
Ashish Goel
Kamesh Munagala
Sukolsak Sakshuwong
Computing Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Shapley Value Weighted Congestion Games
191(14)
Matthias Feldotto
Martin Gairing
Grammateia Kotsialou
Alexander Skopalik
Socially Optimal Mining Pools
205(14)
Ben Fisch
Rafael Pass
Abhi Shelat
Design of an Optimal Frequency Reward Program in the Face of Competition
219(18)
Arpit Goel
Nolan Skochdopole
A Characterization of Undirected Graphs Admitting Optimal Cost Shares
237(15)
Tobias Harks
Anja Huber
Manuel Surek
Approximate Efficiency in Matching Markets
252(14)
Nicole Immorlica
Brendan Lucier
Glen Weyl
Joshua Mollner
Routing Games over Time with FIFO Policy
266(15)
Anisse Ismaili
A Performance-Based Scheme for Pricing Resources in the Cloud
281(13)
Kamal Jain
Tung Mai
Vijay V. Vazirani
Scale Effects in Web Search
294(17)
Di He
Aadharsh Kannan
Tie-Yan Liu
R. Preston McAfee
Tao Qin
Justin M. Rao
Simple Pricing Schemes for the Cloud
311(14)
Ian A. Kash
Peter Key
Warut Suksompong
The Price of Uncertainty in Present-Biased Planning
325(15)
Susanne Albers
Dennis Kraft
Routing Games in the Wild: Efficiency, Equilibration and Regret: Large-Scale Field Experiments in Singapore
340(14)
Barnabe Monnot
Francisco Benita
Georgios Piliouras
Dynamic Pricing in Competitive Markets
354(14)
Paresh Nakhe
Beyond Worst-Case (In)approximability of Nonsubmodular Influence Maximization
368(15)
Grant Schoenebeck
Biaoshuai Tao
Cascades and Myopic Routing in Nonhomogeneous Kleinberg's Small World Model
383(14)
Jie Gao
Grant Schoenebeck
Fang-Yi Yu
Short Papers
Network Congestion Games Are Robust to Variable Demand
397(1)
Jose Correa
Ruben Hoeksma
Marc Schroder
The Crowdfunding Game: Extended Abstract
398(2)
Itai Arieli
Moran Koren
Rann Smorodinsky
The Power of Opaque Products in Pricing
400(1)
Adam N. Elmachtoub
Michael L. Hamilton
Information Aggregation in Overlapping Generations
401(1)
Mohammad Akbarpour
Amin Saberi
Ali Shameli
Networked Markets and Relational Contracts
402(1)
Matt Elliott
Benjamin Golub
Matt V. Leduc
On Variants of Network Flow Stability
403(2)
Young-San Lin
Thanh Nguyen
Balancing Efficiency and Equality in Vehicle Licenses Allocation
405(2)
Zhou Chen
Qi Qi
Changjun Wang
Author Index 407