E-grāmata: Why Associations Matter: The Case for First Amendment Pluralism

"First Amendment rights are hailed as the hallmark of the American constitutional system, protecting religious liberty, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of association from government interference. In Christian Legal Society v. Martinez (2010), however, the Supreme Court demoted freedom of association in the panoply of First Amendment rights. This decline in protection for freedom of association has broad ramifications for the constitutional status of voluntary associations in civil society. Why Associations Matter examines how a fundamental right disappeared from the Supreme Court's reasoning and draws on the political sociology of Robert Nisbet to develop a theoretical framework for bolstering freedom of association in American constitutionalism. Luke Sheahan shows that the case law from NAACP v. Alabama (1958) through Boy Scouts v. Dale (2000) has recognized free association only as an individual right of expressive association derived from the Speech Clause alone. This pattern in Supreme Court jurisprudence culminated in Martinez, in which the Supreme Court refused to uphold the associational right of a student group at a public university to police its own membership based upon the purpose of the group. Sheahan argues that the association case law is flawed at a fundamental level and turns to Nisbet, whose sociological work exposes the problem with a focus on the state and individual to the neglect of nonpolitical associations and institutions"--

First Amendment rights are hailed as the hallmark of the US constitutional system, protecting religious liberty, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of association. But among these rights, freedom of association holds a tenuous position, as demonstrated in the 2010 Supreme Court ruling in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, which upheld a public university’s policy requiring groups seeking official recognition to accept all students regardless of their status or beliefs. This demotion of freedom of association has broad ramifications for the constitutional status of voluntary associations in civil society, Luke C. Sheahan suggests. His book offers a cogent explanation of how this came about, why it matters, and what might be done about it.

Sheahan’s argument centers upon what he calls the “First Amendment Dichotomy” in the Court’s theoretical framework: an understanding of the state and the individual as the two analytically exclusive units of constitutional analysis. Why Associations Matter traces this dichotomy through Supreme Court jurisprudence culminating in Martinez, revealing a pattern of free association treated only as an individual right of expressive association derived from the Speech Clause alone. Sheahan then draws on the political sociology of Robert Nisbet to make a case for recognizing the social importance of associations and institutions that cannot be reduced to their individual members or subsumed into the state for purposes of constitutional analysis.

Translating the sociological qualities of associations into jurisprudential categories, Why Associations Matter provides practical advice for protecting freedom of association through the judiciary and the legislature—and guaranteeing this fundamental right its proper place in American society.

First Amendment rights are hailed as the hallmark of the US constitutional system, protecting religious liberty, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of association. But among these rights, freedom of association holds a tenuous position, as demonstrated in the 2010 Supreme Court ruling in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, which upheld a public university’s policy requiring groups seeking official recognition to accept all students regardless of their status or beliefs. This demotion of freedom of association has broad ramifications for the constitutional status of voluntary associations in civil society, Luke C. Sheahan suggests. His book offers a cogent explanation of how this came about, why it matters, and what might be done about it.

Sheahan’s argument centers upon what he calls the “First Amendment Dichotomy” in the Court’s theoretical framework: an understanding of the state and the individual as the two analytically exclusive units of constitutional analysis. Why Associations Matter traces this dichotomy through Supreme Court jurisprudence culminating in Martinez, revealing a pattern of free association treated only as an individual right of expressive association derived from the Speech Clause alone. Sheahan then draws on the political sociology of Robert Nisbet to make a case for recognizing the social importance of associations and institutions that cannot be reduced to their individual members or subsumed into the state for purposes of constitutional analysis.

Translating the sociological qualities of associations into jurisprudential categories, Why Associations Matter provides practical advice for protecting freedom of association through the judiciary and the legislature—and guaranteeing this fundamental right its proper place in American society.