| Preface |
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iii | |
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xi | |
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xiii | |
| Summary |
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xv | |
| Acknowledgments |
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xxxiii | |
| Abbreviations |
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xxxvii | |
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1 | (6) |
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The Purpose of This Report |
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2 | (1) |
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2 | (1) |
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The Effects of the Drawdown |
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3 | (1) |
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3 | (2) |
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5 | (2) |
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7 | (22) |
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Ending the Combat Mission in Iraq |
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8 | (1) |
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9 | (1) |
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U.S. Military Forces in Iraq |
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10 | (1) |
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Sequencing the Withdrawal of U.S. Combat and Support Forces |
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11 | (1) |
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Implementation and the Rotation Schedule |
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12 | (1) |
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The Security Agreement Referendum |
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12 | (1) |
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13 | (3) |
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14 | (1) |
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Defining the Alternatives |
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15 | (1) |
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Combat Units Depart by April 30, 2010 |
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16 | (3) |
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16 | (1) |
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16 | (1) |
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17 | (1) |
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18 | (1) |
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18 | (1) |
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18 | (1) |
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Mission of U.S. Forces Changes After August 2010 |
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19 | (3) |
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20 | (1) |
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20 | (1) |
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21 | (1) |
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21 | (1) |
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22 | (1) |
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Implications of This Alternative |
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22 | (1) |
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Maintain Combat and Noncombat Units Through December 2011 |
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22 | (3) |
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23 | (1) |
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23 | (1) |
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24 | (1) |
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24 | (1) |
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24 | (1) |
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Implications of This Alternative |
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25 | (1) |
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25 | (4) |
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Shortfalls in the Iraqi Armed Forces' Capability Beyond 2011 |
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26 | (3) |
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Logistics Factors and Constraints Affecting the Drawdown |
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29 | (22) |
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30 | (7) |
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Planning the Redeployment of a Unit |
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31 | (1) |
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Moving U.S. Military Personnel Out of the Region |
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31 | (1) |
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Moving Military Vehicles from the Region |
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32 | (4) |
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36 | (1) |
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37 | (5) |
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Assessment of U.S. Military Personnel Movement Capacity |
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38 | (1) |
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Assessment of Convoy Capacity for Military Vehicles and Unit Equipment |
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38 | (2) |
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Assessment of Staging and Washrack Capacity |
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40 | (1) |
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Assessment of Customs and Agricultural Inspection Capacity |
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40 | (1) |
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Assessment of Sterile Lot Capacity and Disposition Instructions |
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41 | (1) |
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Assessment of Port and Shipping Capacity |
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41 | (1) |
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Assessment of Base Closure or Transfer Time |
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42 | (1) |
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Overall ``Baseline'' Findings |
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42 | (1) |
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Mitigating Logistics Risks or Improving Drawdown Capabilities |
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43 | (6) |
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44 | (2) |
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Reducing Demand on Convoys and on Base Closure or Transfer Time |
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46 | (1) |
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Shifting Demand to Alternative Redeployment Modes---Convoy Substitutes |
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47 | (2) |
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49 | (2) |
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Internal Security and Stability |
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51 | (28) |
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The Role of the MNF-I in Promoting Internal Security |
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54 | (1) |
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54 | (13) |
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56 | (1) |
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Mainstream Armed Opposition Groups |
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57 | (6) |
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Politicized Iraqi Security Forces |
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63 | (3) |
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The Impact of a Weakened Economy |
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66 | (1) |
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66 | (1) |
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Security Needs That Will Remain Unment After Full U.S. Military Withdrawal |
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67 | (4) |
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Direct Threats to U.S. Personnel |
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71 | (4) |
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71 | (2) |
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73 | (1) |
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A Summary of Potential Threats to U.S. Forces and Personnel |
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74 | (1) |
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An Assessment of Drawdown Options in Light of Dangers to Iraq's Security and U.S. Personnel |
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75 | (4) |
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79 | (20) |
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81 | (5) |
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Overt Iranian Military Intervention |
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82 | (1) |
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Covert Iranian Actions and Links to Regional Proxies |
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82 | (1) |
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The Counterweights of Arab Nationalism and Iraqi Shi'ism |
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83 | (1) |
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Iraqis Avoid Provoking Iran |
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83 | (1) |
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Iranian Levers of Influence in Iraq |
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84 | (2) |
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86 | (4) |
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Risks to Saudi Arabia from the New Iraq |
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87 | (2) |
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Saudi Levers of Influence |
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89 | (1) |
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90 | (3) |
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91 | (1) |
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Instruments of Syrian Influence in Iraq |
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91 | (1) |
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The Degree of Syrian Intervention in Iraq |
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92 | (1) |
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93 | (2) |
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95 | (1) |
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Effects of the Drawdown on Iraq's Relations with Regional Powers |
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96 | (3) |
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Serious Challenges Remain |
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96 | (1) |
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Military Intervention by Iraq's Neighbors |
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96 | (1) |
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The Importance of the Political Process |
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97 | (1) |
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The View from Iraq's Neighbors |
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97 | (1) |
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The Possibility of Heightened U.S.-Iranian Tensions |
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97 | (2) |
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99 | (18) |
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The Iraqi Security Forces |
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99 | (3) |
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100 | (1) |
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101 | (1) |
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Creeping Authoritarianism |
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102 | (1) |
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102 | (1) |
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103 | (1) |
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The Arab-Kurdish Conflict |
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103 | (3) |
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104 | (1) |
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104 | (2) |
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Turkish Incursion into Northern Iraq |
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106 | (1) |
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106 | (1) |
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106 | (1) |
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Iranian Subversion of the Iraqi Government |
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106 | (1) |
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106 | (1) |
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107 | (1) |
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A Return to Violence by the Sons of Iraq |
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107 | (1) |
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107 | (1) |
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108 | (1) |
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108 | (1) |
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108 | (1) |
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108 | (1) |
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Vulnerable Groups, Internally Displaced Persons, and Refugees |
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109 | (4) |
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110 | (1) |
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111 | (2) |
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The Referendum on the Security Agreement |
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113 | (4) |
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114 | (1) |
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114 | (3) |
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117 | (36) |
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117 | (2) |
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117 | (1) |
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Arab-Kurdish Armed Conflict |
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117 | (1) |
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118 | (1) |
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The Iraqi Security Forces |
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118 | (1) |
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Reconciliation and Development |
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118 | (1) |
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119 | (2) |
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119 | (1) |
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119 | (1) |
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A Return to Violence by the Sons of Iraq |
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120 | (1) |
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120 | (1) |
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The Study's Legislative Background |
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121 | (2) |
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Drawdown of Remaining Forces |
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123 | (12) |
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Economic and Advisory Issues Involved in a Drawdown of U.S. Forces from Iraq |
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135 | (18) |
| Bibliography |
|
153 | |
