| Preface |
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xvi | |
| Plan of the Book |
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xvii | |
| Pedagogical Features: Applying the Concepts |
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xviii | |
| Innovative Online Resources for Students and Instructors |
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xix | |
| Acknowledgments |
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xx | |
| Introduction |
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xxvi | |
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What Is World Politics and Why Do We Study It? |
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xxvi | |
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Puzzles in Search of Explanations |
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xxix | |
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The Framework: Interests, Interactions, and Institutions |
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xxx | |
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xxxii | |
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Integrating Insights from Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism |
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xxxiii | |
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Thinking Analytically about World Politics |
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xxxix | |
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xl | |
| Part 1: Foundations |
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Chapter 1 What Shaped Our World? A Historical Introduction |
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2 | (40) |
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Thinking Analytically about What Shaped Our World |
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4 | (1) |
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The Emergence of International Relations: The Mercantilist Era |
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5 | (2) |
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How Do We Know? Mercantilism and the 13 Colonies |
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7 | (2) |
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What Shaped Our World? Colonialists and the Colonized |
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9 | (1) |
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10 | (5) |
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10 | (2) |
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12 | (1) |
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13 | (1) |
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14 | (1) |
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15 | (8) |
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15 | (4) |
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World War I and Its Effects |
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19 | (2) |
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21 | (1) |
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22 | (1) |
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23 | (7) |
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23 | (1) |
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24 | (3) |
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27 | (2) |
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The Rise of the Developing World |
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29 | (1) |
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30 | (1) |
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Globalization and Its Discontents |
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30 | (7) |
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30 | (1) |
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Worldwide Economic Developments |
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31 | (2) |
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Challenges to the New Order |
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33 | (4) |
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What Will Shape Our World in the Future? |
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37 | (3) |
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The Great Powers and the World |
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37 | (1) |
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38 | (1) |
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39 | (1) |
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40 | (2) |
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Chapter 2 Understanding Interests, Interactions, and Institutions |
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42 | (50) |
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Thinking Analytically about Interests, Interactions, and Institutions |
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44 | (1) |
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Interests: What Do Actors Want from Politics? |
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45 | (4) |
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47 | (2) |
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What Shaped Our World? The Rise of the State |
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49 | (3) |
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Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want? |
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52 | (17) |
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Cooperation and Bargaining |
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53 | (6) |
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When Can Actors Cooperate? |
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59 | (6) |
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Who Wins and Who Loses in Bargaining? |
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65 | (4) |
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Institutions: Do Rules Matter in World Politics? |
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69 | (4) |
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How Do Institutions Affect Cooperation? |
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70 | (3) |
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How Do We Know? The International Diffusion of Election Monitoring |
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73 | (8) |
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Whom Do Institutions Benefit? |
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77 | (3) |
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80 | (1) |
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Conclusion: Explaining World Politics |
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81 | (3) |
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84 | (2) |
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Special Topic: A Primer on Game Theory |
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86 | (6) |
| Part 2: War and Peace |
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Chapter 3 Why Are There Wars? |
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92 | (52) |
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Thinking Analytically about Why Wars Happen |
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94 | (1) |
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What Is the Purpose of War? |
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95 | (12) |
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Interests at War: What Do States Fight Over? |
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97 | (3) |
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100 | (3) |
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Compellence and Deterrence: Varieties of Coercive Bargaining |
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103 | (4) |
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Do Wars Happen by Mistake? War from Incomplete Information |
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107 | (13) |
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Incentives to Misrepresent and the Problem of Credibility |
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111 | (3) |
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Communicating Resolve: The Language of Coercion |
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114 | (6) |
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Can an Adversary Be Trusted to Honor a Deal? War from Commitment Problems |
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120 | (4) |
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Bargaining over Goods That Are a Source of Future Bargaining Power |
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121 | (2) |
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Prevention: War in Response to Changing Power |
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123 | (1) |
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Controversy: Should the United States Make a Nuclear Deal with Iran? |
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124 | (5) |
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Preemption: War in Response to Fear of Attack |
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127 | (2) |
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How Do We Know? Bargaining and the Duration of War |
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129 | (2) |
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What Shaped Our World? Prevention and Preemption in World War I |
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131 | (1) |
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Is Compromise Always Possible? War from Indivisibility |
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132 | (3) |
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135 | (4) |
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Changing Interests: Declining Conflict over Territory |
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136 | (1) |
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Changing Interactions: The Rising Costs of War |
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137 | (1) |
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Changing Institutions: Democracy and International Organizations |
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138 | (1) |
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139 | (3) |
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142 | (2) |
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Chapter 4 Domestic Politics and War |
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144 | (50) |
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Thinking Analytically about Domestic Politics and War |
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146 | (1) |
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Why Doesn't "Politics Stop at the Water's Edge"? |
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147 | (5) |
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Whose Interests Matter?: Interactions, Institutions, and Influence |
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150 | (2) |
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Do Politicians Spark Wars Abroad in Order to Hold On to Power at Home? |
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152 | (3) |
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154 | (1) |
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How Do We Know? Are Women Leaders More Peaceful than Men? |
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155 | (7) |
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The Rally Effect and the Diversionary Incentive |
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156 | (2) |
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Do Leaders "Wag the Dog"? |
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158 | (3) |
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The Political Costs of War |
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161 | (1) |
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Do Countries Fight Wars to Satisfy the Military or Special Interest Groups? |
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162 | (4) |
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Bureaucratic Politics and the Military |
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163 | (3) |
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What Shaped Our World? The Kargil War and Military Influence in War |
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166 | (9) |
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Interest Groups: Economic and Ethnic Lobbies |
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167 | (2) |
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How Can Small Groups Have a Big Influence on Policy? |
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169 | (2) |
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Limits to Interest Group Influence |
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171 | (2) |
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How Do Domestic Interests Affect International Bargaining? |
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173 | (2) |
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Why Don't Democracies Fight One Another? |
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175 | (12) |
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177 | (3) |
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Representation, Accountability, and Interests in War and Peace |
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180 | (3) |
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Democracy and the Bargaining Interaction |
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183 | (3) |
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Does Democracy Cause Peace? |
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186 | (1) |
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Conclusion: What if All the World Were Democratic? |
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187 | (1) |
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Controversy: Should We Prefer a Friendly Dictator or a Hostile Democracy? |
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188 | (4) |
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192 | (2) |
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Chapter 5 International Institutions and War |
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194 | (52) |
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Thinking Analytically about International Institutions and War |
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196 | (1) |
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Alliances: Why Promise to Fight Someone Else's War? |
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197 | (17) |
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199 | (3) |
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Alliances and Interstate Bargaining |
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202 | (3) |
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How Alliances Establish Credibility |
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205 | (2) |
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Why Aren't Alliance Commitments Ironclad? |
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207 | (1) |
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Analyzing the European Alliance System, 1879-1990 |
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208 | (6) |
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What Shaped Our World? The Future of NATO |
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214 | (2) |
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Collective Security: When Can the UN Keep the Peace? |
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216 | (18) |
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How Does Collective Security Work? |
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217 | (2) |
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The Dilemmas of Collective Security |
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219 | (2) |
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Institutional Responses to the Challenges of Collective Security |
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221 | (2) |
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The Experience of Collective Security: The United Nations |
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223 | (11) |
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Controversy: Should Outsiders Intervene Militarily to Stop Humanitarian Crises? |
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234 | (4) |
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How Do We Know? Does Peacekeeping Keep the Peace? |
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238 | (2) |
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Conclusion: Are Poor Police Better than None? |
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240 | (2) |
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242 | (4) |
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Chapter 6 Violence by Nonstate Actors: Civil War and Terrorism |
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246 | (60) |
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Thinking Analytically about Civil War and Terrorism |
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248 | (1) |
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The Relationship between Civil War and Terrorism |
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249 | (4) |
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Why Does War Occur within States? |
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253 | (5) |
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255 | (2) |
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When Does Dissatisfaction Lead to Armed Opposition? |
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257 | (1) |
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Controversy: Should Every Group Have a State of Its Own? |
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258 | (18) |
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Civil War as a Bargaining Failure |
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266 | (5) |
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Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: The Strategies of Civil War |
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271 | (4) |
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What Can Be Done about Civil War? |
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275 | (1) |
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What Shaped Our World? The Rise of the Islamic State |
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276 | (2) |
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Terrorism: Why Kill Civilians? |
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278 | (12) |
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279 | (2) |
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281 | (3) |
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Terrorism as a Bargaining Failure |
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284 | (5) |
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How Can Terrorists Hope to Win? Strategies of Violence |
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289 | (1) |
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How Do We Know? Does Terrorism Work? |
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290 | (10) |
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Can Terrorism Be Prevented? |
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294 | (6) |
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Conclusion: A Challenge to States? |
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300 | (2) |
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302 | (4) |
| Part 3: International Political Economy |
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Chapter 7 International Trade |
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306 | (58) |
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Thinking Analytically about International Trade |
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308 | (1) |
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What's So Good about Trade? |
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309 | (10) |
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Why Do Countries Trade What They Trade? |
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311 | (5) |
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Trade Restrictions Are the Rule, Not the Exception |
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316 | (3) |
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Why Do Governments Restrict Trade? The Domestic Political Economy of Protection |
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319 | (11) |
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Winners and Losers in International Trade |
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321 | (2) |
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Economic Interests and Trade Policy |
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323 | (4) |
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Domestic Institutions and Trade Policy |
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327 | (3) |
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How Do We Know? Has Trade Contributed to the Polarization of Politics? |
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330 | (6) |
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Costs, Benefits, and Compensation in National Trade Policies |
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334 | (2) |
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How Do Countries Get What They Want? The International Political Economy of Trade |
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336 | (2) |
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Strategic Interaction in International Trade Relations |
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337 | (1) |
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What Shaped Our World? The Single European Market: From Creation to Crisis and Beyond |
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338 | (9) |
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International Institutions and Trade Policy |
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342 | (5) |
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Explaining Trends and Patterns in International Trade |
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347 | (5) |
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Why, within a Country, Are Some Industries Protected and Some Not? |
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347 | (3) |
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Why Have National Trade Policies Varied over Time? |
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350 | (2) |
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Controversy: What Should Be Done When International Trade Harms Workers? |
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352 | (3) |
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Why Do Some Countries Have Higher Trade Barriers than Others? |
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354 | (1) |
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Why Has the World Trading Order Been More or Less Open at Different Times? |
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354 | (1) |
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Conclusion: Trade and Politics |
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355 | (1) |
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356 | (2) |
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Special Topic: Comparative Advantage and the Political Economy of Trade |
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358 | (6) |
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Chapter 8 International Financial Relations |
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364 | (42) |
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Thinking Analytically about International Finance |
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366 | (1) |
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How and Why Do People Invest Overseas? |
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367 | (7) |
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Why Invest Abroad? Why Borrow Abroad? |
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368 | (2) |
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What's the Problem with Foreign Investment? |
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370 | (1) |
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371 | (3) |
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Why Is International Finance Controversial? |
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374 | (8) |
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Debtor Interests and Creditor Interests |
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374 | (3) |
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Debtor-Creditor Interactions |
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377 | (2) |
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Institutions of International Finance |
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379 | (3) |
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Controversy: Is the IMF Biased against Developing Countries? |
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382 | (4) |
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Borrowing and Debt Crises |
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384 | (2) |
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What Shaped Our World? The Latin American Debt Crisis |
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386 | (4) |
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A New Crisis Hits the United States-and the World |
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387 | (3) |
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Foreign Direct Investment: The Economics and Politics of Multinational Corporations |
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390 | (7) |
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Why Do Corporations Go Multinational? |
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390 | (2) |
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Why Do Countries Let Foreign Multinationals In? |
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392 | (2) |
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Host-Country Interactions with MNCs |
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394 | (2) |
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Why Aren't There International Institutions Related to FDI? |
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396 | (1) |
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International Migration: Economics and Political Economy |
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397 | (3) |
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How Do We Know? Explaining Public Opinion on Immigration |
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400 | (2) |
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Conclusion: The Politics of International Investment |
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402 | (2) |
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404 | (2) |
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Chapter 9 International Monetary Relations |
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406 | (40) |
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Thinking Analytically about International Monetary Relations |
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408 | (1) |
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What Are Exchange Rates, and Why Do They Matter? |
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409 | (4) |
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How Are Currency Values Determined? |
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410 | (1) |
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Allowing the Exchange Rate to Change |
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411 | (2) |
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Who Cares about Exchange Rates, and Why? |
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413 | (7) |
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413 | (4) |
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417 | (3) |
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Controversy: Should Countries Be Allowed to Manipulate Their Currencies? |
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420 | (2) |
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International Politics and International Monetary Relations |
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422 | (11) |
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International Monetary Cooperation and Conflict |
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423 | (1) |
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International Monetary Regimes |
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424 | (1) |
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A Short History of International Monetary Systems |
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425 | (2) |
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What Shaped Our World? The Wizard of Oz and the Gold Standard |
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427 | (3) |
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Regional Monetary Arrangements: The Euro |
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430 | (3) |
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What Happens When Currencies Collapse? |
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433 | (3) |
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434 | (1) |
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International Repercussions |
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435 | (1) |
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How Do We Know? Devaluation or Depression in the European Union |
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436 | (5) |
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Containing Currency Crises |
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440 | (1) |
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Conclusion: Currencies, Conflict, and Cooperation |
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441 | (3) |
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444 | (2) |
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Chapter 10 Development: Causes of the Wealth and Poverty of Nations |
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446 | (38) |
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Thinking Analytically about Development |
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448 | (1) |
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If Everyone Wants Development, Why Is It So Hard to Achieve? |
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449 | (1) |
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449 | (1) |
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What Shaped Our World? Paths to Development |
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450 | (8) |
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451 | (5) |
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456 | (2) |
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How Do We Know? Explaining Developmental Differences: North and South America |
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458 | (2) |
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How Do Rich Countries Affect the Developing World? |
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460 | (7) |
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Did Colonialism Hamper Development? |
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461 | (3) |
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How Does the International Economy Affect LDCs? |
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464 | (1) |
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Are International Institutions Biased against LDCs? |
|
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465 | (2) |
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Development Policies and Development Politics |
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467 | (9) |
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Import-Substituting Industrialization |
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468 | (2) |
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Export-Oriented Industrialization |
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470 | (1) |
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Globalization and Development |
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470 | (2) |
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Attempts to Remedy the Bias of International Institutions |
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472 | (2) |
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Is Foreign Aid an Answer? |
|
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474 | (1) |
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Globalization and Its Discontents |
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475 | (1) |
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Controversy: What Helps the Global Poor Best: Aid or Trade? |
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476 | (3) |
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Conclusion: Toward Global Development |
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479 | (3) |
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Addressing International Factors |
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480 | (1) |
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Addressing Domestic Factors |
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481 | (1) |
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482 | (2) |
| Part 4: Transnational Politics |
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Chapter 11 International Law and Norms |
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484 | (36) |
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Thinking Analytically about International Law and Norms |
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486 | (1) |
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What Is International Law? |
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487 | (4) |
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How Is International Law Made? |
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489 | (2) |
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What Shaped Our World? Crimes against Humanity |
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491 | (8) |
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Is All International Law the Same? |
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492 | (2) |
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Does International Law Matter? |
|
|
494 | (5) |
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What Are International Norms? |
|
|
499 | (3) |
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Controversy: Extrajudicial Execution and the War on Terror |
|
|
502 | (12) |
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How Are International Norms Created? |
|
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504 | (4) |
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|
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508 | (1) |
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Why Do Global Actors Comply with International Norms and Law? |
|
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508 | (6) |
|
How Do We Know? Social Media and the Arab Spring |
|
|
514 | (1) |
|
Conclusion: Can States Be Constrained? |
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515 | (3) |
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518 | (2) |
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520 | (44) |
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Thinking Analytically about Human Rights |
|
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522 | (1) |
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What Are International Human Rights? |
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|
523 | (6) |
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Why Are Human Rights Controversial? |
|
|
526 | (3) |
|
What Shaped Our World? The Asian Values Debate |
|
|
529 | (3) |
|
Are Some Rights More Important than Others? |
|
|
530 | (2) |
|
Controversy: Should Economic Sanctions Be Imposed on Governments That Violate Human Rights? |
|
|
532 | (2) |
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Why Do Individuals and States Care about the Human Rights of Others? |
|
|
534 | (9) |
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Why Do States Violate Human Rights? |
|
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534 | (4) |
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Why Do States Sign Human Rights Agreements? |
|
|
538 | (5) |
|
Do States Observe International Human Rights Law? |
|
|
543 | (5) |
|
Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference? |
|
|
545 | (3) |
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How Do We Know? Measuring Human Rights Practices |
|
|
548 | (2) |
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What Can Lead to Better Protection of International Human Rights? |
|
|
550 | (10) |
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When Do States Take Action on Human Rights? |
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551 | (2) |
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Will Protection of Human Rights Improve in the Future? |
|
|
553 | (7) |
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Conclusion: Why Protect Human Rights? |
|
|
560 | (2) |
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562 | (2) |
|
Chapter 13 The Global Environment |
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564 | (44) |
|
Thinking Analytically about the Global Environment |
|
|
566 | (1) |
|
Why Are Good Intentions Not Good Enough? |
|
|
567 | (9) |
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Collective Action and the Environment |
|
|
569 | (2) |
|
Solving Collective Action Problems |
|
|
571 | (5) |
|
What Shaped Our World? The Montreal Protocol and the Protection of the Ozone Layer |
|
|
576 | (3) |
|
Why Do Polluters Usually Win? |
|
|
579 | (1) |
|
How Do We Know? Climate Change and Conflict |
|
|
580 | (12) |
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Domestic Winners and Losers |
|
|
582 | (2) |
|
International Winners and Losers |
|
|
584 | (6) |
|
Bargaining over the Future Environment |
|
|
590 | (2) |
|
Controversy: Who Should Bear the Costs of Addressing Global Climate Change? |
|
|
592 | (3) |
|
How Can Institutions Promote International Environmental Cooperation? |
|
|
595 | (8) |
|
Setting Standards and Verifying Compliance |
|
|
598 | (2) |
|
Facilitating Decision Making |
|
|
600 | (2) |
|
|
|
602 | (1) |
|
Conclusion: Can Global Environmental Cooperation Succeed? |
|
|
603 | (3) |
|
|
|
606 | (2) |
| Part 5: Looking Ahead |
|
|
Chapter 14 Challenges to the Global Order |
|
|
608 | |
|
Thinking Analytically about the Future of World Politics |
|
|
610 | (1) |
|
The Postwar Order and Its Challenges |
|
|
611 | (7) |
|
Can the Spread of WMD and Cyberattacks Be Stopped? |
|
|
618 | (9) |
|
What Do Theory and History Tell Us? |
|
|
619 | (5) |
|
Preventing the Spread of WMD and Cyber Warfare |
|
|
624 | (3) |
|
What Shaped Our World? The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty |
|
|
627 | (6) |
|
Will China and the United States Fight for Global Leadership? |
|
|
633 | (16) |
|
What Do Theory and History Tell Us? |
|
|
636 | (4) |
|
A Coming Showdown or Peaceful Engagement? |
|
|
640 | (4) |
|
What Will the United States Do? |
|
|
644 | (5) |
|
Will Globalization Survive the Populist Backlash? |
|
|
649 | (11) |
|
What Do Theory and History Tell Us? |
|
|
650 | (1) |
|
Economic Costs of Globalization |
|
|
651 | (3) |
|
The Rise of the Populists |
|
|
654 | (6) |
|
How Do We Know? Why Do States Build Border Walls? |
|
|
660 | (2) |
|
Backlash and the International Trading System |
|
|
661 | (1) |
|
Conclusion: Can Common Interests Prevail? |
|
|
662 | (4) |
|
|
|
666 | |
| Glossary |
|
A-1 | |
| Credits |
|
A-9 | |
| Index |
|
A-11 | |
