Preface |
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xiii | |
Acknowledgments |
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xv | |
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PART I THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATION |
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1 | (30) |
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Chapter 1 Defining Crisis Communication |
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3 | (14) |
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A Definition of Crisis Communication |
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5 | (1) |
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6 | (1) |
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6 | (1) |
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7 | (1) |
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Expanding the Traditional Definition of Crisis |
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7 | (1) |
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Disasters, Emergencies, Crisis, and Risk |
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7 | (2) |
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9 | (1) |
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9 | (2) |
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11 | (1) |
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The Significance of Crisis in a Global Environment |
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12 | (1) |
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Understanding the Misconceptions Associated With Crises and Crisis Communication |
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13 | (3) |
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16 | (1) |
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Chapter 2 Understanding Crisis Communication Theory and Practice |
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17 | (14) |
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Media Theories and Crisis Communication |
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18 | (1) |
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19 | (1) |
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20 | (1) |
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21 | (1) |
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22 | (2) |
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Organizational Theories of Crisis Communication |
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24 | (1) |
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24 | (1) |
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25 | (1) |
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Situational Crisis Communication Theory |
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25 | (1) |
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The Discourse of Renewal Theory |
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26 | (1) |
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26 | (1) |
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26 | (1) |
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Prospective Versus Retrospective Vision |
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27 | (1) |
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Effective Organizational Rhetoric |
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27 | (1) |
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Crisis Communication Theories That Describe, Explain, and Prescribe |
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27 | (1) |
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Understanding and Defining the Threat Bias in Crisis Communication |
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28 | (1) |
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29 | (2) |
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PART II THE LESSONS AND PRACTICAL APPLICATION |
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31 | (136) |
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Chapter 3 Lessons on Effective Crisis Communication |
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33 | (22) |
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34 | (1) |
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Partnering With Crisis Audiences |
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35 | (1) |
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Understanding the Diversity of Your Audiences |
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36 | (1) |
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Primary and Secondary Stakeholders Defined |
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37 | (2) |
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Communicating With Underrepresented Groups During Crises |
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39 | (1) |
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A Word on Partnerships and Listening |
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40 | (2) |
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What Information Do Stakeholders Need Following a Crisis? |
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42 | (1) |
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Communicate Early and Often With Both Internal and External Stakeholders |
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42 | (1) |
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Identifying the Cause of the Crisis |
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42 | (1) |
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Contacting Everyone Affected by the Crisis |
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43 | (1) |
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Determining Current and Future Risks |
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43 | (1) |
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Is Certain Communication Always the Best Approach? |
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44 | (1) |
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Avoid Overreassuring Your Stakeholders |
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45 | (1) |
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Tell Your Stakeholders How to Protect Themselves |
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46 | (1) |
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Reducing and Intensifying Uncertainty Before, During, and After Organizational Crises |
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47 | (1) |
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A Summary of Crisis Communication Research and Practice and Renewal |
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47 | (3) |
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Social Media and Effective Crisis Communication |
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50 | (1) |
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The Power of Positive Action |
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51 | (1) |
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52 | (3) |
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Chapter 4 Applying the Lessons To Produce Effective Crisis Communication |
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55 | (26) |
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Example 4.1 The Largest Environmental Crisis in United States History: BP and the United States Coast Guard Respond |
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55 | (3) |
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58 | (1) |
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58 | (1) |
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Example 4.2 A Plant Fire at Maiden Mills |
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59 | (1) |
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Crisis Preparation and Planning |
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60 | (1) |
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Courageous Communication in the Wake of a Disaster |
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61 | (1) |
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61 | (1) |
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62 | (1) |
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Example 4.3 The WUCF and PBS Meet the Helpers Initiative: An Innovative Response to a Shocking Crisis |
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63 | (1) |
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Creating an Original Crisis Response for Children |
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63 | (1) |
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64 | (1) |
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65 | (1) |
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65 | (2) |
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Example 4.4 What's in a Name? Beef Products Incorporated Face "Pink Slime" |
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67 | (1) |
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A Third Party Crisis Response |
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67 | (1) |
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68 | (1) |
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68 | (2) |
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Example 4.5 Rural Renewal After a Tornado in Greensburg, Kansas |
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70 | (1) |
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Initial Framing of the Crisis |
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70 | (2) |
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Consequences of a Bold Environmental Vision Following the Tornado |
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72 | (1) |
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72 | (1) |
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73 | (1) |
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73 | (2) |
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Example 4.6 A Costly YouTube Hoax for Domino's Pizza |
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75 | (1) |
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Unusual Challenges for Domino's |
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75 | (1) |
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76 | (1) |
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77 | (1) |
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78 | (3) |
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Chapter 5 Lessons on Managing Crisis Uncertainty Effectively |
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81 | (14) |
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Consider the Impact of Uncertainty on Crisis Communication |
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82 | (1) |
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Unexpected Crises and Uncertainty |
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83 | (1) |
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Nonroutine Crisis Events and Uncertainty |
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83 | (1) |
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Threat Perception and Uncertainty |
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84 | (1) |
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Short Response Time and Uncertainty |
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84 | (2) |
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The Impact of Crisis-Induced Uncertainty on Stakeholders |
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86 | (2) |
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Managing Communication Ambiguity Ethically During Crisis |
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88 | (1) |
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Consistent Questions of Ambiguity |
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89 | (2) |
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Training, Simulations, and Uncertainty |
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91 | (1) |
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Belief Structures and Uncertainty |
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92 | (1) |
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93 | (2) |
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Chapter 6 Applying the Lessons for Managing Crisis Uncertainty Effectively |
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95 | (28) |
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Example 6.1 Tennessee Valley Authority and the Kingston Ash Slide |
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95 | (1) |
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Missed Opportunities in Crisis Preparation and Planning |
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95 | (1) |
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Tennessee Valley Authority's Response to an Uncertain Crisis |
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96 | (3) |
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99 | (1) |
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99 | (2) |
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Example 6.2 L'Aquila: A Case of Miscommunication |
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101 | (1) |
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Communicating to the Public About L'Aquila's Immediate Risk |
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101 | (1) |
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101 | (2) |
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103 | (1) |
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103 | (1) |
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103 | (2) |
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Example 6.3 General Motors and Mary Barra |
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105 | (1) |
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Honesty, Candor, and Openness |
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106 | (1) |
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Communicate With Compassion. Concern, and Empathy |
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106 | (1) |
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Process Approaches and Policy Development |
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107 | (1) |
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107 | (1) |
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107 | (2) |
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Example 6.4 King Car's Response to the 2008 Melamine Crisis |
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109 | (1) |
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Reducing Crisis Uncertainty |
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109 | (1) |
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A Guiding Vision for King Car's Crisis Communication |
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110 | (1) |
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Initial Crisis Communication |
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110 | (1) |
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111 | (1) |
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111 | (1) |
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112 | (1) |
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112 | (1) |
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Example 6.5 Flint, Michigan, Water Contamination |
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113 | (2) |
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Failure to Listen to Public Concerns |
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115 | (1) |
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115 | (1) |
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Failure to Accept Uncertainty and Ambiguity |
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116 | (1) |
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116 | (1) |
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116 | (2) |
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Example 6.6 FUKUSHIMA Daiichi: Uncertainty Created by Three Interrelated Crisis Events |
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118 | (2) |
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120 | (1) |
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120 | (3) |
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Chapter 7 Lessons on Effective Crisis Leadership |
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123 | (16) |
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The Importance of Effective Leadership |
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124 | (1) |
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Why Visibility Following a Crisis is Important |
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125 | (2) |
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Developing Networks of Support |
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127 | (2) |
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Being Available, Open, and Honest |
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129 | (1) |
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The Impact of Leadership on Renewal Following a Crisis |
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129 | (1) |
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Ineffective Leadership During a Crisis |
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130 | (2) |
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What Makes an Effective Crisis Leader? |
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132 | (1) |
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132 | (1) |
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Contingency Approach to Leadership |
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133 | (1) |
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Transformational Leadership |
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134 | (1) |
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134 | (1) |
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Managing Uncertainty, Responding, Resolving, and Learning from Crisis |
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135 | (1) |
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Suggestions for the Leader as Spokesperson |
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136 | (2) |
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138 | (1) |
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Chapter 8 Applying the Lessons for Developing Effective Crisis Leadership |
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139 | (28) |
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Example 8.1 October 1, Route 91, Las Vegas, Nevada |
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139 | (3) |
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142 | (1) |
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143 | (1) |
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Example 8.2 A Fire at Cole Hardwood |
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144 | (1) |
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Crisis Planning and Preparation |
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144 | (1) |
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Leading Instinctively After a Disaster |
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145 | (1) |
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146 | (1) |
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146 | (1) |
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Example 8.3 The Largest Foodborne Illness Outbreak in History: Schwan's Sales Enterprises |
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147 | (1) |
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148 | (1) |
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149 | (1) |
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150 | (1) |
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150 | (1) |
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150 | (1) |
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Example 8.4 Freedom Industries and the West Virginia Drinking Water Contamination |
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151 | (1) |
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152 | (1) |
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153 | (1) |
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154 | (1) |
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155 | (1) |
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Example 8.5 United Airlines: Failed Crisis Leadership |
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156 | (4) |
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160 | (1) |
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160 | (1) |
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Example 8.6 SeaWorld's Orca: A Symbol of Tragedy |
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161 | (1) |
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161 | (1) |
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Blackfish: A Condemning Documentary |
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162 | (1) |
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163 | (1) |
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163 | (1) |
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164 | (3) |
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PART III THE OPPORTUNITIES |
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167 | (72) |
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Chapter 9 Learning Through Failure |
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169 | (12) |
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Failing to Learn From Failure |
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170 | (2) |
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172 | (2) |
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174 | (1) |
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175 | (2) |
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177 | (1) |
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178 | (3) |
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Chapter 10 Risk Communication |
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181 | (16) |
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Distinguishing Between Risk And Crisis |
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182 | (2) |
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184 | (3) |
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Analyzing Multiple Audiences |
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187 | (3) |
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Convergence Theory and Risk Communication |
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190 | (2) |
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Responsible Risk Communication |
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192 | (1) |
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192 | (2) |
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194 | (1) |
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194 | (3) |
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Chapter 11 Responding to the Ethical Demands of Crisis |
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197 | (14) |
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199 | (2) |
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Corporations as Moral Agents |
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201 | (1) |
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202 | (1) |
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203 | (1) |
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Responsibility and Accountability |
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203 | (2) |
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205 | (1) |
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206 | (2) |
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The Role of Values in a Crisis Response |
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208 | (2) |
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210 | (1) |
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Chapter 12 Facilitating Renewal Through Effective Crisis Communication |
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211 | (28) |
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212 | (1) |
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Theoretical Components of the Discourse of Renewal |
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212 | (1) |
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213 | (1) |
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214 | (1) |
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Positive Stakeholder Relationships |
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215 | (1) |
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Provisional Rather Than Strategic Communication |
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216 | (1) |
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217 | (1) |
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Prospective Versus Retrospective Vision |
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217 | (1) |
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218 | (1) |
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Engaging in Effective Organizational Rhetoric |
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218 | (2) |
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Summary of the Discourse of Renewal |
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220 | (1) |
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The Discourse of Renewal and Crisis Planning |
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220 | (2) |
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222 | (1) |
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223 | (16) |
Index |
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239 | (8) |
About the Authors |
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247 | |