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E-grāmata: Liability of Financial Supervisors and Resolution Authorities

Edited by (Professor of Financial Law, Radbound University of Nijmegen), Edited by (Professor of Commercial and Financial Law, University of Reading), Edited by (Professor of Public Economic Law, University of Athens)
  • Formāts: 528 pages
  • Sērija : Oxford EU Financial Regulation
  • Izdošanas datums: 18-Aug-2023
  • Izdevniecība: Oxford University Press
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780192639714
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  • Formāts: 528 pages
  • Sērija : Oxford EU Financial Regulation
  • Izdošanas datums: 18-Aug-2023
  • Izdevniecība: Oxford University Press
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780192639714

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Since the global financial crisis of 2008, claims by clients, shareholders, depositors, and bondholders of financial firms have increased against financial supervisors and resolution authorities for inadequate supervision or resolution action. Liability of Financial Supervisors and Resolution
Authorities is the first book to offer a thorough and systematic analysis of the liability regimes which apply to financial supervisors and resolution authorities at the EU level (particularly relevant since the European Banking Union came into operation in 2014), at the level of individual EU
Member States, as well as in other major jurisdictions worldwide.

The jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction approach provides a detailed analysis of the liability regimes as they apply to local financial supervisors and resolution authorities in major civil law, common law, and mixed legal system jurisdictions. This global view of the primary financial jurisdictions as
examples provides a unique and comprehensive overview which is of great practical and theoretical importance.

The work concludes with a comparative law evaluation that discusses to what extent limitations of the liability of national financial supervisors and resolution authorities are valid under the EU rules on Member State liability. It also explores whether it would be preferable to adopt a uniform
liability standard for the European Central Bank (ECB), the Single Resolution Board (SRB), and national financial supervisors and resolution authorities. Furthermore, it addresses whether it would be preferable to adopt a provision to the effect that the Court of Justice of the European Union has
exclusive jurisdiction in relation to the ECB, SRB, and the national financial supervisors and resolution authorities.
Table of Cases
xvii
Table of Legislation
xxxix
List of Abbreviations
iv
List of Contributors
lix
PART I GENERAL PART
1 Introduction
3(6)
Danny Busch
Christos V. Gortsos
Gerard McMeel
I Introduction
1(4)
II Liability of European Financial Authorities
5(4)
III Liability of National Financial Supervisors and Resolution Authorities
9(3)
IV Comparative Law Evaluation
12
PART II EU LAW
2 Liability of the European Financial Authorities - ECB, SRB, EBA, ESMA, EIOPA, and ESRB
9(46)
Danny Busch
Christos V. Gortsos
I Introduction
1(1)
II Rationale of Supervision and Supervisory Model
2(58)
1 General
2(4)
2 The European System of Financial Supervisors
6(3)
3 The European Banking Union
9(46)
4 A European Anti-Money Laundering Authority?
55(5)
III Liability Standard
60(19)
1 Non-contractual Liability
60(13)
2 Contractual Liability
73(3)
3 Liability of Staff
76(2)
4 Inability to Cover Claims by the Financial Resources of the ECB, the SRB, or the Relevant ES A
78(1)
IV Detailed Liability Criteria
79(64)
1 General
79(1)
2 A Sufficiently Serious Breach of EU Law
80(51)
3 Imputability
131(1)
4 The Rule of EU Law Infringed Must Be Intended to Confer Rights on Individuals
132(5)
5 Direct Causal Link
137(5)
6 Actual and Certain Damage
142(1)
V Evaluation
143
PART III CIVIL LAW LEGAL SYSTEMS
3 Germany
55(16)
Jens-Hinrich Binder
I Introduction
1(2)
II Rationale of Supervision and Supervisory Model
3(1)
III Liability Standard
4(9)
1 Overview
4(3)
2 The History of Section 4(4) FinDAG: Liability for Supervisory Failure - a Realistic Scenario?
7(2)
3 The Remaining Scope for Liability: Claims by Supervised Entities
9(1)
4 Francovich Liability for Failure to Transpose Relevant EU Law Requirements?
10(3)
IV Detailed Liability Criteria
13(7)
1 Overview
13(1)
2 Acts or Omissions by `Officials'
14(1)
3 Acts or Omissions While Discharging a Public Duty
15(1)
4 Breach of Duty towards the Aggrieved Party
16(2)
5 Causal Connection and Amount of Damages
18(1)
6 Negligence or Intention
19(1)
V Liability of Financial Supervisors in Practice
20(4)
1 Banking Supervision
20(2)
2 Liability in Resolution Cases
22(1)
3 Liability for Negligent Securities Supervision
23(1)
VI Evaluation
24(47)
4 Austria
71(18)
Sebastian Mock
I Introduction
1(1)
II General Principles of State Liability in Austria
2(2)
III Rationale of Supervision and Supervisory Model
4(1)
IV Liability Standard
5(11)
1 General
5(1)
2 (Additional) Legal Sources
6(1)
3 Liable Financial Supervisors and Their Representatives
7(8)
4 (No) Direct Liability of the Republic of Austria - Violation of European Law?
15(1)
V Detailed Criteria for Liability
16(13)
1 General
16(1)
2 Acting in the Enforcement of Federal Act (Hoheitliches Handeln)
17(1)
3 Damage (Schaden)
18(5)
4 Causation (Kausalitat)
23(1)
5 Illegality (Rechtswidrigkeit)
24(1)
6 Fault (Verschulden)
25(1)
7 Amount of Compensation
26(1)
8 Burden of Proof
27(1)
9 Assistance of the Austrian Financial Market Authority
28(1)
VI No (Personal) Liability of the Employees and Bodies
29(1)
VII Liability of Financial Supervisors in Practice
30(3)
1 General
30(1)
2 Historical Development before the Introduction of § 3, Subsection 1, Sentence 3 FMABG
31(1)
3 New Developments in the Case of the Commerzialbank Mattersburg im Burgenland AG
32(1)
VIII Summary
33(54)
IX Annex-§ 3 Federal Act on the Establishing and Organization of the Financial Market Authority
87(2)
5 France
89(14)
Thierry Bonneau
I Introduction
1(8)
II Rationale of Supervision and Supervisory Model
9(9)
1 Rationale of Supervision
9(3)
2 Supervisory Model
12(6)
III Liability Standard
18(24)
1 General
18(2)
2 Regulatory Acts
20(3)
3 Individual Decisions
23(6)
4 Application of the Public Law Rules
29(3)
5 Limitation of Liability
32(10)
IV Detailed Liability Criteria
42(3)
1 General
42(1)
2 Gross Negligence/Gross Fault
43(1)
3 Damage and Causation
44(1)
V Liability of Financial Supervisors in Practice
45(13)
1 General
45(3)
2 Financial Authorities
48(4)
3 Banking Authorities
52(3)
4 Amount of Damages Claimed
55(1)
5 Out of Court Settlements
56(1)
6 Extra-judicial Routes
57(1)
VI Evaluation
58(45)
6 The Netherlands
103(50)
Danny Busch
I Introduction
1(1)
II Rationale of Supervision and Supervisory Model
2(12)
1 General
2(1)
2 Conduct-of-business Supervision
3(2)
3 Prudential Supervision
5(4)
4 The Creation of the Dutch `Twin Peaks' Model
9(5)
III Liability Standard
14(18)
1 General
14(7)
2 Historical Background
21(5)
3 The Impact of EU Law
26(6)
IV Detailed Liability Criteria
32(76)
1 General
32(2)
2 Tortious Conduct
34(28)
3 Imputability
62(12)
4 The Influence of the Principle of Formal Legal Force on the Requirements of Tortious Conduct and Imputability
74(9)
5 Relativity
83(5)
6 Causation
88(8)
7 Loss
96(11)
8 Joint and Several Liability
107(1)
V Liability of Financial Supervisors in Practice
108(32)
1 General
108(1)
2 Policyholders
109(4)
3 Investors
113(2)
4 Deposit Holders
115(7)
5 Trustees in Bankruptcy
122(3)
6 Former Bank Directors
125(4)
7 Pension Funds
129(11)
VI Evaluation
140(13)
7 Italy
153(22)
Andrea Perrone
I Introduction
1(3)
II The Italian Supervisory Model and its Rationale
4(8)
III Liability Standards for Financial Supervisors
12(15)
1 Vicarious Liability for Public Officers' Wrongdoing
13(2)
2 Tort Liability under General Private Law
15(8)
3 Quasi-contractual Liability
23(4)
IV Detailed Liability Criteria
27(14)
1 Unlawfulness
28(3)
2 Accountability
31(5)
3 Causation
36(2)
4 Damages
38(3)
V Liability of Financial Supervisors in Practice
41(19)
1 Administrative Law Cases
42(6)
2 Private Law Cases
48(12)
VI Evaluation
60(115)
8 Spain
175(34)
David Ramos Munoz
Elia Cerrato Garcia
Carlos Bosque Argachal
I Introduction
1(4)
II Rationale of Supervision and Supervisory Model
5(16)
1 The Spanish Model of Financial Supervision: A Sectoral Approach
5(2)
2 Rationale of Financial Supervision: Constitutional and Sectoral Basis
7(13)
3 Closing Gaps between Supervisory Competencies in Spain: BdE (Alleged) Prevalence
20(1)
III Liability Standard
21(13)
1 Liability of Financial Supervisors in Spain: A More Theoretical than Actual Possibility
21(2)
2 Special Administrative Procedure to Claim Liability from Financial Supervisors
23(3)
3 Source of Liability and Absence of Liability Limitations
26(8)
IV Detailed Liability Criteria
34(24)
1 Introduction: The Four Requirements to Establish Public Administration's Financial Liability
34(1)
2 Detailed Analysis of the Criteria Determining Financial Supervisors' Liability
35(23)
V Liability of Financial Supervisors in Practice
58(74)
1 Scope of the Analysis and Parameters Examined
58(4)
2 Liability of Financial Supervisors: Comprehensive Analysis of Spanish Case Law
62(58)
3 Liability of Spanish Financial Supervisors in the European Context
120(12)
VI Conclusion
132(77)
9 Portugal
209(26)
Luis Silva Morais
Lucio Tome Feteira
I Introduction
1(2)
II Rationale of Supervision and Supervisory Model
3(14)
III Liability Standard
17(11)
IV Detaded Liability Criteria
28(22)
1 General
28(3)
2 Voluntary Action or Omission
31(4)
3 Unlawfulness
35(5)
4 Accountability
40(6)
5 Damage
46(3)
6 Causal Connection between the Voluntary Action or Omission and the Damage Suffered
49(1)
V Liability of Financial Supervisors in Practice
50(11)
VI Evaluation
61(174)
10 Greece
235
Christos V. Gortsos
Elli K. Anastopoulou
I Introduction: Competent Authorities for Financial Supervision and Resolution in Greece
1(13)
1 The Bank of Greece (BoG)
1(9)
2 The Hellenic Capital Market Commission (HCMC)
10(4)
II Rationale of Supervision and Supervisory Model
14(8)
1 Statutory Objectives of Supervision
14(4)
2 Supervisory Model
18(4)
III Liability Standard
22(34)
1 Civil Liability and its Limitations
22(15)
2 Liability of Members of Staff
37(6)
3 Resolution and AML Tasks
43(4)
4 Francovich Doctrine
47(9)
IV Detailed Liability Criteria
56(22)
1 Introductory Remarks
56(2)
2 Act or Omission of the Supervisory Authority
58(2)
3 Act or Omission during the Exercise of Public Authority (Internal Relevance)
60(4)
4 Illegality
64(7)
5 Damage
71(5)
6 Causal Link between the Illegal Act or Omission and the Damage
76(2)
V Liability of Financial Supervisors in Practice
78(26)
1 Introductory Remarks
78(2)
2 Banking Supervision
80(6)
3 Banking Resolution
86(7)
4 Capital Markets Supervision
93(11)
VI Evaluation
104(167)
PART IV COMMON LAW LEGAL SYSTEMS
11 United Kingdom
271(50)
Gerard McMeel
I Introduction
1(1)
II Rationale of Supervision and Supervisory Model
2(32)
1 Changing Supervisory Models
2(1)
2 Why Regulate Financial Services?
3(3)
3 The UK Financial Regulatory System
6(2)
4 The Background to FSMA as Originally Enacted
8(2)
5 Northern Rock and the Global Financial Crisis
10(2)
6 Legislative Measures for Resolution of Financial Institutions
12(5)
7 Financial Regulatory Reform Back on the Agenda
17(1)
8 The Coalition Government and the Introduction of `Twin Peaks'
18(5)
9 The Financial Services Act 2012
23(1)
10 The Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013
24(1)
11 The Principal Legislation: The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 as Amended
25(3)
12 The Shift to `Twin Peaks' Regulation
28(1)
13 The Statutory Objectives and the Regulatory Principles
29(4)
14 A Note on Brexit
33(1)
III Liability Standard
34(44)
1 Introduction
34(2)
2 The Statutory Immunity from Damages
36(8)
3 The Common Law of Torts
44(3)
4 The Seminal Case of Hedley Byrne
47(1)
5 The Three-Stage Test
48(1)
6 Incrementalism
49(2)
7 Assumption of Responsibility
51(4)
8 Summary of Developments
55(3)
9 Novel Duty of Care Cases
58(2)
10 Yuen Kun Yeu v. Attorney General for Hong Kong
60(6)
11 Davis v. Radcliffe
66(2)
12 Tort of Misfeasance in Public Office
68(3)
13 The Three Rivers Case
71(7)
IV Detailed Liability Criteria
78(24)
1 Overview of Requirements for Misfeasance
78(2)
2 Breach of Duty
80(4)
3 Accountability or State of Mind
84(4)
4 Causal Connection
88(2)
5 Damages
90(4)
6 Relativity
94(1)
7 Claims under the Human Rights Act
95(7)
V Liability of Financial Supervisors in Practice
102(12)
1 Introduction
102(2)
2 The Parliamentary Ombudsman
104(2)
3 The Complaints Commissioner
106(5)
4 London Capital & Finance pic
111(3)
VI Evaluation
114(207)
12 Ireland
321(28)
Blanaid Clarke
I Introduction
1(1)
II Rationale of Supervision and Supervisory Model
2(6)
1 Regulatory and Statutory Objectives of Supervision
2(1)
2 Supervisory Model
3(5)
III Liability Standard
8(22)
1 Liability for Breach of EU Law
11(6)
2 Standard of Liability for Public Authorities
17(4)
3 Statutory Immunity
21(9)
IV Detailed Liability Criteria
30(20)
1 Causation
31(1)
2 Statutory Duty Simpliciter
32(9)
3 Common Law Tort of Negligence
41(2)
4 Misfeasance in Public Office
43(7)
V Liability of Financial Supervisors in Practice
50(5)
VI Evaluation
55(294)
13 Hong Kong and Singapore
349(22)
Sandra Annette Booysen
I Introduction
1(4)
II Rationale of Supervision and the Supervisory Model
5(10)
1 Hong Kong
5(6)
2 Singapore
11(4)
III Liability Standard
15(3)
IV Detailed Liability Criteria
18(10)
1 The Tort of Negligence
18(3)
2 Breach of Statutory Duty
21(2)
3 The Economic Torts
23(2)
4 Defamation
25(1)
5 Misfeasance in Public Office
26(2)
V Liability of Financial Supervisors in Practice
28(15)
1 Hong Kong
29(1)
2 Singapore
30(2)
3 Features of the Immunity Provisions
32(4)
4 Judicial Review
36(7)
VI Concluding Remarks
43(328)
14 United States of America
371(22)
Lissa Lamkin Broome
I Introduction
1(5)
II Rationale of Supervision and Supervisory Model
6(7)
III Liability Standard
13(4)
IV Detailed Liability Criteria 14
17(29)
1 Sovereign Immunity, the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), and the Discretionary Function Exception to the FTCA
17(10)
2 Affirmative Defences Asserted against the FDIC when it Sues Officers or Directors of Insolvent Institutions
27(19)
V Liability of Financial Supervisors in Practice
46(4)
VI Evaluation
50(343)
15 Australia
393(36)
Jeannie Marie Paterson
Ian Paterson
I Introduction
1(8)
1 General
1(1)
2 The Constitutional Background
2(3)
3 Historical Financial Crises
5(4)
II Rationale of Supervision and Supervisory Model
9(46)
1 The Regulators
9(3)
2 The Underlying Rationale/Goal of Supervision in Australia
12(8)
3 What is the Model for Financial Supervision in your Country?
20(35)
III Liability Standard
55(22)
1 General
55(2)
2 No General Immunity
57(2)
3 Limitation of Liability of APRA and Statutory Managers Appointed by it
59(10)
4 Reserve Bank
69(4)
5 ASIC
73(1)
6 Immunity from Execution
74(1)
7 Statutory claim for compensation against the Commonwealth
75(2)
IV Detailed Liability Criteria
77(52)
1 The Tort of Misfeasance in Public Office in Australia
77(27)
2 Other Torts-Intimidation
104(3)
3 Claims for Acquisition of Property not on Just Terms
107(22)
V Liability of Financial Supervisors in Practice
129(9)
1 General
129(1)
2 Pyramid
130(2)
3 HIH Insurance
132(1)
4 Storm Financial
133(1)
5 Administrative Proceedings
134(4)
VI Evaluation
138(291)
PART V MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS
16 The Republic of South Africa
429(32)
Engela Catharina Schlemmer
I Introduction
1(1)
II Rationale of Supervision and Supervisory Model
2(24)
1 General
2(11)
2 The Financial Sector Regulation Act
13(13)
III Liability Standard
26(28)
1 General
26(5)
2 Potential Delictual Liability for Financial Sector Supervisors under South African Law
31(23)
IV Accountability in Terms of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act
54(5)
1 General
54(4)
2 The Financial Services Tribunal
58(1)
VI Evaluation
59(402)
PART VI COMPARATIVE LAW EVALUATION
17 Comparative Law Evaluation
461(50)
Danny Busch
Christos V. Gortsos
Gerard McMeel
I Introduction
1(1)
II The Growing Tendency to Limit the Liability of Financial Supervisors and Resolution Authorities
2(74)
1 General
2(2)
2 A Fault that Goes beyond Negligence
4(48)
3 The Margin of Discretion: The Portuguese Case
52(5)
4 The Protective Purpose of the Norm Infringed: The German Case
57(9)
5 The Causation Requirement
66(1)
6 The Loss Requirement
67(4)
7 Unlawfulness Combined with the Causation Requirement: The Spanish Case
71(2)
8 Proportionate Liability
73(3)
III Limitations of Liability under Attack
76(62)
1 General
76(1)
2 Arguments Based on Constitutional Law
77(27)
3 Arguments Based on European Union Law
104(34)
IV Towards Harmonization of Liability within the European Banking Union
138(29)
1 General
138(1)
2 SSM
139(15)
3 SRM
154(13)
V Concluding Remarks
167(344)
Index 511
Danny Busch is the Financial Law Chair, Professor of Law, and the founding Director of the Financial Law Centre (FLC) at Radboud University of Nijmegen. He is a Research Fellow of Harris Manchester College and a Fellow of the Commercial Law Centre, University of Oxford. He is also Visiting Professor at Universitą Cattolica del Sacro Cuore di Milano and Université de Nice Cōte d'Azur. He is a member of the Dutch Appeals Committee of the Financial Services Complaints Tribunal (KiFiD). After having graduated with highest honours in Dutch law from Utrecht University in 1997, he was awarded the degree of Magister Juris in European and Comparative Law by the University of Oxford (St John's College) in 1998.

Christos Gortsos is Professor of Public Economic Law and Academic Head of the LLM Program in Financial Regulation at the Law School of the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens. He is President of the Academic Board of the European Banking Institute (EBI); Vice-President of the Board of Appeal of the European Supervisory Authority (ESA) a member of the expert group of the European Parliament on banking resolution; visiting Professor at the Europa-Institut of the University of Saarland; research Partner at the University Research Priority Program (URPP) Financial Market Regulation at the University of Zürich; and Member and Academic Coordinator of the Committee on International Monetary Law of the International Law Association (MOCOMILA).

Gerard McMeel QC is Professor of Commercial Law and Director of the Centre for Commercial Law and Financial Regulation at the University of Reading. He is also a Barrister of England and Wales and was appointed Queen's Counsel in March 2020. He is an associate member of Quadrant Chambers in London.