|
|
xvii | |
|
|
xxxix | |
|
|
iv | |
|
|
lix | |
|
|
|
|
3 | (6) |
|
|
|
|
|
1 | (4) |
|
II Liability of European Financial Authorities |
|
|
5 | (4) |
|
III Liability of National Financial Supervisors and Resolution Authorities |
|
|
9 | (3) |
|
IV Comparative Law Evaluation |
|
|
12 | |
|
|
|
2 Liability of the European Financial Authorities - ECB, SRB, EBA, ESMA, EIOPA, and ESRB |
|
|
9 | (46) |
|
|
|
|
1 | (1) |
|
II Rationale of Supervision and Supervisory Model |
|
|
2 | (58) |
|
|
2 | (4) |
|
2 The European System of Financial Supervisors |
|
|
6 | (3) |
|
3 The European Banking Union |
|
|
9 | (46) |
|
4 A European Anti-Money Laundering Authority? |
|
|
55 | (5) |
|
|
60 | (19) |
|
1 Non-contractual Liability |
|
|
60 | (13) |
|
|
73 | (3) |
|
|
76 | (2) |
|
4 Inability to Cover Claims by the Financial Resources of the ECB, the SRB, or the Relevant ES A |
|
|
78 | (1) |
|
IV Detailed Liability Criteria |
|
|
79 | (64) |
|
|
79 | (1) |
|
2 A Sufficiently Serious Breach of EU Law |
|
|
80 | (51) |
|
|
131 | (1) |
|
4 The Rule of EU Law Infringed Must Be Intended to Confer Rights on Individuals |
|
|
132 | (5) |
|
|
137 | (5) |
|
6 Actual and Certain Damage |
|
|
142 | (1) |
|
|
143 | |
|
PART III CIVIL LAW LEGAL SYSTEMS |
|
|
|
|
55 | (16) |
|
|
|
1 | (2) |
|
II Rationale of Supervision and Supervisory Model |
|
|
3 | (1) |
|
|
4 | (9) |
|
|
4 | (3) |
|
2 The History of Section 4(4) FinDAG: Liability for Supervisory Failure - a Realistic Scenario? |
|
|
7 | (2) |
|
3 The Remaining Scope for Liability: Claims by Supervised Entities |
|
|
9 | (1) |
|
4 Francovich Liability for Failure to Transpose Relevant EU Law Requirements? |
|
|
10 | (3) |
|
IV Detailed Liability Criteria |
|
|
13 | (7) |
|
|
13 | (1) |
|
2 Acts or Omissions by `Officials' |
|
|
14 | (1) |
|
3 Acts or Omissions While Discharging a Public Duty |
|
|
15 | (1) |
|
4 Breach of Duty towards the Aggrieved Party |
|
|
16 | (2) |
|
5 Causal Connection and Amount of Damages |
|
|
18 | (1) |
|
6 Negligence or Intention |
|
|
19 | (1) |
|
V Liability of Financial Supervisors in Practice |
|
|
20 | (4) |
|
|
20 | (2) |
|
2 Liability in Resolution Cases |
|
|
22 | (1) |
|
3 Liability for Negligent Securities Supervision |
|
|
23 | (1) |
|
|
24 | (47) |
|
|
71 | (18) |
|
|
|
1 | (1) |
|
II General Principles of State Liability in Austria |
|
|
2 | (2) |
|
III Rationale of Supervision and Supervisory Model |
|
|
4 | (1) |
|
|
5 | (11) |
|
|
5 | (1) |
|
2 (Additional) Legal Sources |
|
|
6 | (1) |
|
3 Liable Financial Supervisors and Their Representatives |
|
|
7 | (8) |
|
4 (No) Direct Liability of the Republic of Austria - Violation of European Law? |
|
|
15 | (1) |
|
V Detailed Criteria for Liability |
|
|
16 | (13) |
|
|
16 | (1) |
|
2 Acting in the Enforcement of Federal Act (Hoheitliches Handeln) |
|
|
17 | (1) |
|
|
18 | (5) |
|
|
23 | (1) |
|
5 Illegality (Rechtswidrigkeit) |
|
|
24 | (1) |
|
|
25 | (1) |
|
|
26 | (1) |
|
|
27 | (1) |
|
9 Assistance of the Austrian Financial Market Authority |
|
|
28 | (1) |
|
VI No (Personal) Liability of the Employees and Bodies |
|
|
29 | (1) |
|
VII Liability of Financial Supervisors in Practice |
|
|
30 | (3) |
|
|
30 | (1) |
|
2 Historical Development before the Introduction of § 3, Subsection 1, Sentence 3 FMABG |
|
|
31 | (1) |
|
3 New Developments in the Case of the Commerzialbank Mattersburg im Burgenland AG |
|
|
32 | (1) |
|
|
33 | (54) |
|
IX Annex-§ 3 Federal Act on the Establishing and Organization of the Financial Market Authority |
|
|
87 | (2) |
|
|
89 | (14) |
|
|
|
1 | (8) |
|
II Rationale of Supervision and Supervisory Model |
|
|
9 | (9) |
|
1 Rationale of Supervision |
|
|
9 | (3) |
|
|
12 | (6) |
|
|
18 | (24) |
|
|
18 | (2) |
|
|
20 | (3) |
|
|
23 | (6) |
|
4 Application of the Public Law Rules |
|
|
29 | (3) |
|
5 Limitation of Liability |
|
|
32 | (10) |
|
IV Detailed Liability Criteria |
|
|
42 | (3) |
|
|
42 | (1) |
|
2 Gross Negligence/Gross Fault |
|
|
43 | (1) |
|
|
44 | (1) |
|
V Liability of Financial Supervisors in Practice |
|
|
45 | (13) |
|
|
45 | (3) |
|
|
48 | (4) |
|
|
52 | (3) |
|
4 Amount of Damages Claimed |
|
|
55 | (1) |
|
5 Out of Court Settlements |
|
|
56 | (1) |
|
|
57 | (1) |
|
|
58 | (45) |
|
|
103 | (50) |
|
|
|
1 | (1) |
|
II Rationale of Supervision and Supervisory Model |
|
|
2 | (12) |
|
|
2 | (1) |
|
2 Conduct-of-business Supervision |
|
|
3 | (2) |
|
|
5 | (4) |
|
4 The Creation of the Dutch `Twin Peaks' Model |
|
|
9 | (5) |
|
|
14 | (18) |
|
|
14 | (7) |
|
|
21 | (5) |
|
|
26 | (6) |
|
IV Detailed Liability Criteria |
|
|
32 | (76) |
|
|
32 | (2) |
|
|
34 | (28) |
|
|
62 | (12) |
|
4 The Influence of the Principle of Formal Legal Force on the Requirements of Tortious Conduct and Imputability |
|
|
74 | (9) |
|
|
83 | (5) |
|
|
88 | (8) |
|
|
96 | (11) |
|
8 Joint and Several Liability |
|
|
107 | (1) |
|
V Liability of Financial Supervisors in Practice |
|
|
108 | (32) |
|
|
108 | (1) |
|
|
109 | (4) |
|
|
113 | (2) |
|
|
115 | (7) |
|
|
122 | (3) |
|
|
125 | (4) |
|
|
129 | (11) |
|
|
140 | (13) |
|
|
153 | (22) |
|
|
|
1 | (3) |
|
II The Italian Supervisory Model and its Rationale |
|
|
4 | (8) |
|
III Liability Standards for Financial Supervisors |
|
|
12 | (15) |
|
1 Vicarious Liability for Public Officers' Wrongdoing |
|
|
13 | (2) |
|
2 Tort Liability under General Private Law |
|
|
15 | (8) |
|
3 Quasi-contractual Liability |
|
|
23 | (4) |
|
IV Detailed Liability Criteria |
|
|
27 | (14) |
|
|
28 | (3) |
|
|
31 | (5) |
|
|
36 | (2) |
|
|
38 | (3) |
|
V Liability of Financial Supervisors in Practice |
|
|
41 | (19) |
|
1 Administrative Law Cases |
|
|
42 | (6) |
|
|
48 | (12) |
|
|
60 | (115) |
|
|
175 | (34) |
|
|
|
|
|
1 | (4) |
|
II Rationale of Supervision and Supervisory Model |
|
|
5 | (16) |
|
1 The Spanish Model of Financial Supervision: A Sectoral Approach |
|
|
5 | (2) |
|
2 Rationale of Financial Supervision: Constitutional and Sectoral Basis |
|
|
7 | (13) |
|
3 Closing Gaps between Supervisory Competencies in Spain: BdE (Alleged) Prevalence |
|
|
20 | (1) |
|
|
21 | (13) |
|
1 Liability of Financial Supervisors in Spain: A More Theoretical than Actual Possibility |
|
|
21 | (2) |
|
2 Special Administrative Procedure to Claim Liability from Financial Supervisors |
|
|
23 | (3) |
|
3 Source of Liability and Absence of Liability Limitations |
|
|
26 | (8) |
|
IV Detailed Liability Criteria |
|
|
34 | (24) |
|
1 Introduction: The Four Requirements to Establish Public Administration's Financial Liability |
|
|
34 | (1) |
|
2 Detailed Analysis of the Criteria Determining Financial Supervisors' Liability |
|
|
35 | (23) |
|
V Liability of Financial Supervisors in Practice |
|
|
58 | (74) |
|
1 Scope of the Analysis and Parameters Examined |
|
|
58 | (4) |
|
2 Liability of Financial Supervisors: Comprehensive Analysis of Spanish Case Law |
|
|
62 | (58) |
|
3 Liability of Spanish Financial Supervisors in the European Context |
|
|
120 | (12) |
|
|
132 | (77) |
|
|
209 | (26) |
|
|
|
|
1 | (2) |
|
II Rationale of Supervision and Supervisory Model |
|
|
3 | (14) |
|
|
17 | (11) |
|
IV Detaded Liability Criteria |
|
|
28 | (22) |
|
|
28 | (3) |
|
2 Voluntary Action or Omission |
|
|
31 | (4) |
|
|
35 | (5) |
|
|
40 | (6) |
|
|
46 | (3) |
|
6 Causal Connection between the Voluntary Action or Omission and the Damage Suffered |
|
|
49 | (1) |
|
V Liability of Financial Supervisors in Practice |
|
|
50 | (11) |
|
|
61 | (174) |
|
|
235 | |
|
|
|
I Introduction: Competent Authorities for Financial Supervision and Resolution in Greece |
|
|
1 | (13) |
|
1 The Bank of Greece (BoG) |
|
|
1 | (9) |
|
2 The Hellenic Capital Market Commission (HCMC) |
|
|
10 | (4) |
|
II Rationale of Supervision and Supervisory Model |
|
|
14 | (8) |
|
1 Statutory Objectives of Supervision |
|
|
14 | (4) |
|
|
18 | (4) |
|
|
22 | (34) |
|
1 Civil Liability and its Limitations |
|
|
22 | (15) |
|
2 Liability of Members of Staff |
|
|
37 | (6) |
|
3 Resolution and AML Tasks |
|
|
43 | (4) |
|
|
47 | (9) |
|
IV Detailed Liability Criteria |
|
|
56 | (22) |
|
|
56 | (2) |
|
2 Act or Omission of the Supervisory Authority |
|
|
58 | (2) |
|
3 Act or Omission during the Exercise of Public Authority (Internal Relevance) |
|
|
60 | (4) |
|
|
64 | (7) |
|
|
71 | (5) |
|
6 Causal Link between the Illegal Act or Omission and the Damage |
|
|
76 | (2) |
|
V Liability of Financial Supervisors in Practice |
|
|
78 | (26) |
|
|
78 | (2) |
|
|
80 | (6) |
|
|
86 | (7) |
|
4 Capital Markets Supervision |
|
|
93 | (11) |
|
|
104 | (167) |
|
PART IV COMMON LAW LEGAL SYSTEMS |
|
|
|
|
271 | (50) |
|
|
|
1 | (1) |
|
II Rationale of Supervision and Supervisory Model |
|
|
2 | (32) |
|
1 Changing Supervisory Models |
|
|
2 | (1) |
|
2 Why Regulate Financial Services? |
|
|
3 | (3) |
|
3 The UK Financial Regulatory System |
|
|
6 | (2) |
|
4 The Background to FSMA as Originally Enacted |
|
|
8 | (2) |
|
5 Northern Rock and the Global Financial Crisis |
|
|
10 | (2) |
|
6 Legislative Measures for Resolution of Financial Institutions |
|
|
12 | (5) |
|
7 Financial Regulatory Reform Back on the Agenda |
|
|
17 | (1) |
|
8 The Coalition Government and the Introduction of `Twin Peaks' |
|
|
18 | (5) |
|
9 The Financial Services Act 2012 |
|
|
23 | (1) |
|
10 The Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 |
|
|
24 | (1) |
|
11 The Principal Legislation: The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 as Amended |
|
|
25 | (3) |
|
12 The Shift to `Twin Peaks' Regulation |
|
|
28 | (1) |
|
13 The Statutory Objectives and the Regulatory Principles |
|
|
29 | (4) |
|
|
33 | (1) |
|
|
34 | (44) |
|
|
34 | (2) |
|
2 The Statutory Immunity from Damages |
|
|
36 | (8) |
|
3 The Common Law of Torts |
|
|
44 | (3) |
|
4 The Seminal Case of Hedley Byrne |
|
|
47 | (1) |
|
|
48 | (1) |
|
|
49 | (2) |
|
7 Assumption of Responsibility |
|
|
51 | (4) |
|
8 Summary of Developments |
|
|
55 | (3) |
|
9 Novel Duty of Care Cases |
|
|
58 | (2) |
|
10 Yuen Kun Yeu v. Attorney General for Hong Kong |
|
|
60 | (6) |
|
|
66 | (2) |
|
12 Tort of Misfeasance in Public Office |
|
|
68 | (3) |
|
|
71 | (7) |
|
IV Detailed Liability Criteria |
|
|
78 | (24) |
|
1 Overview of Requirements for Misfeasance |
|
|
78 | (2) |
|
|
80 | (4) |
|
3 Accountability or State of Mind |
|
|
84 | (4) |
|
|
88 | (2) |
|
|
90 | (4) |
|
|
94 | (1) |
|
7 Claims under the Human Rights Act |
|
|
95 | (7) |
|
V Liability of Financial Supervisors in Practice |
|
|
102 | (12) |
|
|
102 | (2) |
|
2 The Parliamentary Ombudsman |
|
|
104 | (2) |
|
3 The Complaints Commissioner |
|
|
106 | (5) |
|
4 London Capital & Finance pic |
|
|
111 | (3) |
|
|
114 | (207) |
|
|
321 | (28) |
|
|
|
1 | (1) |
|
II Rationale of Supervision and Supervisory Model |
|
|
2 | (6) |
|
1 Regulatory and Statutory Objectives of Supervision |
|
|
2 | (1) |
|
|
3 | (5) |
|
|
8 | (22) |
|
1 Liability for Breach of EU Law |
|
|
11 | (6) |
|
2 Standard of Liability for Public Authorities |
|
|
17 | (4) |
|
|
21 | (9) |
|
IV Detailed Liability Criteria |
|
|
30 | (20) |
|
|
31 | (1) |
|
2 Statutory Duty Simpliciter |
|
|
32 | (9) |
|
3 Common Law Tort of Negligence |
|
|
41 | (2) |
|
4 Misfeasance in Public Office |
|
|
43 | (7) |
|
V Liability of Financial Supervisors in Practice |
|
|
50 | (5) |
|
|
55 | (294) |
|
13 Hong Kong and Singapore |
|
|
349 | (22) |
|
|
|
1 | (4) |
|
II Rationale of Supervision and the Supervisory Model |
|
|
5 | (10) |
|
|
5 | (6) |
|
|
11 | (4) |
|
|
15 | (3) |
|
IV Detailed Liability Criteria |
|
|
18 | (10) |
|
|
18 | (3) |
|
2 Breach of Statutory Duty |
|
|
21 | (2) |
|
|
23 | (2) |
|
|
25 | (1) |
|
5 Misfeasance in Public Office |
|
|
26 | (2) |
|
V Liability of Financial Supervisors in Practice |
|
|
28 | (15) |
|
|
29 | (1) |
|
|
30 | (2) |
|
3 Features of the Immunity Provisions |
|
|
32 | (4) |
|
|
36 | (7) |
|
|
43 | (328) |
|
14 United States of America |
|
|
371 | (22) |
|
|
|
1 | (5) |
|
II Rationale of Supervision and Supervisory Model |
|
|
6 | (7) |
|
|
13 | (4) |
|
IV Detailed Liability Criteria 14 |
|
|
17 | (29) |
|
1 Sovereign Immunity, the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), and the Discretionary Function Exception to the FTCA |
|
|
17 | (10) |
|
2 Affirmative Defences Asserted against the FDIC when it Sues Officers or Directors of Insolvent Institutions |
|
|
27 | (19) |
|
V Liability of Financial Supervisors in Practice |
|
|
46 | (4) |
|
|
50 | (343) |
|
|
393 | (36) |
|
|
|
|
1 | (8) |
|
|
1 | (1) |
|
2 The Constitutional Background |
|
|
2 | (3) |
|
3 Historical Financial Crises |
|
|
5 | (4) |
|
II Rationale of Supervision and Supervisory Model |
|
|
9 | (46) |
|
|
9 | (3) |
|
2 The Underlying Rationale/Goal of Supervision in Australia |
|
|
12 | (8) |
|
3 What is the Model for Financial Supervision in your Country? |
|
|
20 | (35) |
|
|
55 | (22) |
|
|
55 | (2) |
|
|
57 | (2) |
|
3 Limitation of Liability of APRA and Statutory Managers Appointed by it |
|
|
59 | (10) |
|
|
69 | (4) |
|
|
73 | (1) |
|
6 Immunity from Execution |
|
|
74 | (1) |
|
7 Statutory claim for compensation against the Commonwealth |
|
|
75 | (2) |
|
IV Detailed Liability Criteria |
|
|
77 | (52) |
|
1 The Tort of Misfeasance in Public Office in Australia |
|
|
77 | (27) |
|
2 Other Torts-Intimidation |
|
|
104 | (3) |
|
3 Claims for Acquisition of Property not on Just Terms |
|
|
107 | (22) |
|
V Liability of Financial Supervisors in Practice |
|
|
129 | (9) |
|
|
129 | (1) |
|
|
130 | (2) |
|
|
132 | (1) |
|
|
133 | (1) |
|
5 Administrative Proceedings |
|
|
134 | (4) |
|
|
138 | (291) |
|
PART V MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS |
|
|
|
16 The Republic of South Africa |
|
|
429 | (32) |
|
Engela Catharina Schlemmer |
|
|
|
1 | (1) |
|
II Rationale of Supervision and Supervisory Model |
|
|
2 | (24) |
|
|
2 | (11) |
|
2 The Financial Sector Regulation Act |
|
|
13 | (13) |
|
|
26 | (28) |
|
|
26 | (5) |
|
2 Potential Delictual Liability for Financial Sector Supervisors under South African Law |
|
|
31 | (23) |
|
IV Accountability in Terms of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act |
|
|
54 | (5) |
|
|
54 | (4) |
|
2 The Financial Services Tribunal |
|
|
58 | (1) |
|
|
59 | (402) |
|
PART VI COMPARATIVE LAW EVALUATION |
|
|
|
17 Comparative Law Evaluation |
|
|
461 | (50) |
|
|
|
|
|
1 | (1) |
|
II The Growing Tendency to Limit the Liability of Financial Supervisors and Resolution Authorities |
|
|
2 | (74) |
|
|
2 | (2) |
|
2 A Fault that Goes beyond Negligence |
|
|
4 | (48) |
|
3 The Margin of Discretion: The Portuguese Case |
|
|
52 | (5) |
|
4 The Protective Purpose of the Norm Infringed: The German Case |
|
|
57 | (9) |
|
5 The Causation Requirement |
|
|
66 | (1) |
|
|
67 | (4) |
|
7 Unlawfulness Combined with the Causation Requirement: The Spanish Case |
|
|
71 | (2) |
|
8 Proportionate Liability |
|
|
73 | (3) |
|
III Limitations of Liability under Attack |
|
|
76 | (62) |
|
|
76 | (1) |
|
2 Arguments Based on Constitutional Law |
|
|
77 | (27) |
|
3 Arguments Based on European Union Law |
|
|
104 | (34) |
|
IV Towards Harmonization of Liability within the European Banking Union |
|
|
138 | (29) |
|
|
138 | (1) |
|
|
139 | (15) |
|
|
154 | (13) |
|
|
167 | (344) |
Index |
|
511 | |