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Rules of Thought [Mīkstie vāki]

4.83/5 (6 ratings by Goodreads)
(University of British Columbia), (Queen's University Belfast)
  • Formāts: Paperback / softback, 368 pages, height x width x depth: 234x156x20 mm, weight: 554 g
  • Izdošanas datums: 24-Mar-2016
  • Izdevniecība: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0198748183
  • ISBN-13: 9780198748182
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Rules of ThoughtPalielināt
  • Formāts: Paperback / softback, 368 pages, height x width x depth: 234x156x20 mm, weight: 554 g
  • Izdošanas datums: 24-Mar-2016
  • Izdevniecība: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0198748183
  • ISBN-13: 9780198748182
Citas grāmatas par šo tēmu:
Permanent link: https://www.kriso.lv/db/9780198748182.html
Keywords:
The Rules of Thought develops a rationalist theory of mental content while defending a traditional epistemology of philosophy. Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Benjamin W. Jarvis contend that a capacity for pure rational thought is fundamental to mental content itself and underwrites our quotidian reasoning and extraordinary philosophical engagement alike. Part I of the book develops a Fregean theory of mental content, according to which rational relations between propositions play a central role in individuating contents; the theory is designed to be sensitive not only to Frege's puzzle and other data that have motivated rationalist conceptions of content, but also to considerations in the philosophy of mind and language that have motivated neo-Russellian views. Part II articulates a theory of the a priori, and shows that, given the framework of Part I, it is very plausible that much philosophical work of interest is genuinely a priori. Notably, it is no part of the picture developed that intuitions have an important role to play, either in mental content, or in the epistemology of the a priori; Part III defends this departure from rationalist orthodoxy.

Recenzijas

an impressive tome . . . that helps to crystallize a framework of ways of thinking and fundamental problems for the philosophy of philosophy . . . provides comprehensive scaffolding for, as well as fresh insights into, the theory of content and epistemology of a sophisticated rationalist conception of philosophy. * Gurpreet Rattan, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews *

Preface xi
Introduction: Objective Rules of Thought 1(14)
§ 1 Philosophical anti-exceptionalism
3(2)
§ 2 Pure rational thinking
5(2)
§ 3 Philosophical traditionalism
7(2)
§ 4 Experiential rationalism
9(1)
§ 5 The intersubjective validity and objectivity of rational inquiry
10(5)
Part I Propositions, Fregean Sense, and Rational Modality
1 A Fregean Theory of Propositional Attitudes
15(32)
§ 1.1 Propositions as structures of concepts
15(2)
§ 1.2 Concepts
17(2)
§ 1.3 Use and representational content
19(2)
§ 1.4 The language of thought
21(1)
§ 1.5 Conclusive rational relations
22(1)
§ 1.6 Trouble from the Preface Paradox?
23(1)
§ 1.7 Proof and refutation
24(2)
§ 1.8 Fregean senses
26(3)
§ 1.9 An alternative theory of Fregean senses
29(3)
§ 1.10 Distinguishing senses of "rational commitment"
32(3)
§ 1.11 Realizing propositional attitudes
35(4)
§ 1.12 Rules and rationality
39(3)
§ 1.13 Conclusive rationality and defeasibility
42(5)
2 A Theory of Rational Modality
47(28)
§ 2.1 Rational entailment
47(3)
§ 2.2 Rational possibility and other family notions
50(2)
§ 2.3 Rational and metaphysical entailment
52(1)
§ 2.4 Coherence and rational modality
53(1)
§ 2.5 Rationally possible scenarios and truth conditions
54(1)
§ 2.6 Rational entailment and revision
55(3)
§ 2.7 R-Possibility, "epistemic possibility," and neo-Russellianism
58(3)
§ 2.8 The rationality version of Frege's puzzle
61(4)
§ 2.9 R-Possibility and Frege's puzzle
65(2)
§ 2.10 Kripke's "A Puzzle about Belief" and Frege's puzzle
67(1)
§ 2.11 David Chalmers's "epistemic possibilities"
68(1)
§ 2.12 Against two-dimensionalism
69(6)
3 The Psychological Realization of Fregean Sense
75(33)
§ 3.1 Ontology
75(1)
§ 3.2 Quinean revisability
75(2)
§ 3.3 Harman on Bonjour
77(2)
§ 3.4 "Two Dogmas of Empiricism"
79(2)
§ 3.5 The psychological reality of rational entailment
81(5)
§ 3.6 Our theory of psychological reality contrasted: Peacocke
86(1)
§ 3.7 Our theory of psychological reality contrasted: Davidson
87(2)
§ 3.8 Our theory of the psychological reality of rational entailment recapitulated
89(1)
§ 3.9 General second-order inferential competencies
90(3)
§ 3.10 Theory-building
93(2)
§ 3.11 Indeterminate rational relations
95(2)
§ 3.12 Kripke and proper names
97(3)
§ 3.13 Indeterminate singular concepts
100(2)
§ 3.14 Fregean sense, descriptivism, and conceptual role
102(3)
§ 3.15 Non-intentional rule-following
105(3)
4 The Sociability of a Fregean Theory
108(24)
§ 4.1 Social anti-individualism
109(1)
§ 4.2 Analyticity and social anti-individualism
110(1)
§ 4.3 The publicity of propositions and concepts
111(2)
§ 4.4 Social Fregeanism
113(2)
§ 4.5 Deferential and non-deferential concept possession
115(2)
§ 4.6 Proper names again
117(1)
§ 4.7 Timothy Williamson on conceptual truths
118(2)
§ 4.8 Conceptual refinement
120(1)
§ 4.9 Socially externalizing rationality
121(4)
§ 4.10 Propositional attitude ascriptions and testimony
125(3)
§ 4.11 A naive neo-Russellian theory of propositional attitude ascriptions
128(4)
5 Fregean Sense First
132(29)
§ 5.1 The minimalist explanation
133(1)
§ 5.2 Inherent and essential rational relations
134(2)
§ 5.3 Reductive strategies
136(1)
§ 5.4 Reduction, factorization, and analysis
137(2)
§ 5.5 Boghossian and concept possession
139(4)
§ 5.6 Peacocke and metasemantics
143(4)
§ 5.7 Wright, Enoch and Schechter, and pragmatism
147(7)
§ 5.8 Field and evaluativism
154(7)
Part II Rationality, Apriority, and Philosophy
6 A Theory of the A Priori
161(18)
§ 6.1 Apriority and propositional justification
162(2)
§ 6.2 An alternative approach: Albert Casullo
164(1)
§ 6.3 A priori transitions in thought
165(1)
§ 6.4 Experience in a warranting role
166(3)
§ 6.5 Experience and d-justification
169(1)
§ 6.6 Apriority and r-necessity
170(1)
§ 6.7 Apriority and empirical indefeasibility*
171(3)
§ 6.8 Is apriority homogeneous?
174(2)
§ 6.9 Is our theory of the a priori vacuous?
176(1)
§ 6.10 The nature of experience
177(2)
7 A Priori Philosophy. Responses to Objections
179(19)
§ 7.1 A posteriori knowledge of a priori faculties
179(2)
§ 7.2 Limiting the challenge: Non-basic methods?
181(3)
§ 7.3 Knowledge and knowledge of knowledge
184(2)
§ 7.4 A priori reliability of a priori methods
186(1)
§ 7.5 Philosophy and knowledge of philosophical abilities
187(1)
§ 7.6 Thought-experiments and the quotidian
188(1)
§ 7.7 Perceptual faculties in imagination
189(2)
§ 7.8 Peeking as self-experimentation?
191(3)
§ 7.9 Misleading "a priori" feelings
194(4)
8 The Content of Thought-Experiment Judgments
198(18)
§ 8.1 Formalizing thought-experiment arguments: Necessity?
199(2)
§ 8.2 Timothy Williamson's counterfactual formulation
201(1)
§ 8.3 Against the counterfactual formulation
202(1)
§ 8.4 Attempted patches
203(1)
§ 8.5 Thought-experiments as fictions
204(2)
§ 8.6 Fictions fixing content
206(3)
§ 8.7 Disanalogies between thought-experiments and fictions?
209(3)
§ 8.8 Reasoning and thought-experiments
212(1)
§ 8.9 Other argumentative roles for thought-experiments
213(1)
§ 8.10 Non-argumentative roles for thought-experiments
214(2)
9 The Epistemology of Thought-Experiment Judgments
216(15)
§ 9.1 Content and inferential competencies
217(1)
§ 9.2 Reliability and knowledge about imaginary scenarios
218(3)
§ 9.3 Two points
221(3)
§ 9.4 Knowledge of necessity
224(1)
§ 9.5 Categorization and apriority
225(1)
§ 9.6 On conceptual analysis
226(5)
10 Rational Imagination and Modal Epistemology
231(30)
§ 10.1 Imagination as supposition
232(2)
§ 10.2 Imagination and possibility
234(1)
§ 10.3 Coherent imagination
235(1)
§ 10.4 Rational imagination
236(3)
§ 10.5 Defeasible inference in imagination
239(1)
§ 10.6 R-modality and metaphysical modality
240(2)
§ 10.7 The coherent impossible
242(1)
§ 10.8 From rational to metaphysical possibility
243(3)
§ 10.9 Moral theorems
246(1)
§ 10.10 Mathematical truths
247(1)
§ 10.11 A priori knowledge of rational modality
248(2)
§ 10.12 Overstipulation
250(11)
Appendix A The misidentification response
252(3)
Appendix B Natural kinds
255(6)
Part III Intuitions and Philosophy
11 The Nature of Intuitions
261(13)
§ 11.1 Eliminativism
262(1)
§ 11.2 Reductionism
263(1)
§ 11.3 The robust picture of intuitions
264(1)
§ 11.4 Williamson on phenomenology
265(2)
§ 11.5 Earlenbaugh and Molyneux
267(4)
§ 11.6 Reductionism without insignificance
271(3)
12 Against Strong Experiential Rationalism
274(27)
§ 12.1 Strong experiential rationalism
275(2)
§ 12.2 Intuitions and evidence
277(2)
§ 12.3 Evidence concerning the psychological
279(2)
§ 12.4 Blind irrationality
281(1)
§ 12.5 What you can't see, can't rationally constrain you?
282(2)
§ 12.6 The intersubjective validity of rational norms
284(1)
§ 12.7 The objectivity of rational norms
285(3)
§ 12.8 Reliabilist strong experiential rationalism
288(2)
§ 12.9 Against phenomenal conservatism
290(4)
§ 12.10 Against general foundationalism
294(1)
§ 12.11 Against subjective foundationalism
295(2)
§ 12.12 Intuitions and evidence revisited
297(2)
§ 12.13 Intuitions and purely rational inquiry
299(2)
13 Intuition as a Source of Evidence?
301(18)
§ 13.1 A simple argument
301(2)
§ 13.2 Blind irrationality reconsidered
303(1)
§ 13.3 Epistemology and psychology
304(3)
§ 13.4 Apriority and the "New Evil Demon" problem
307(2)
§ 13.5 Perceptual justification and the Problem of the Speckled Hen
309(3)
§ 13.6 Failure of justified belief
312(2)
§ 13.7 Intuiting and perceiving compared
314(1)
§ 13.8 Intuiting and perceiving contrasted
315(2)
§ 13.9 The Benacerraf-Field challenge
317(2)
14 Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Methodology
319(16)
§ 14.1 Positive experimental philosophy
319(3)
§ 14.2 Negative experimental philosophy
322(2)
§ 14.3 The use of intuitions in philosophy
324(1)
§ 14.4 The critique generalized?
325(4)
§ 14.5 Epistemology and methodology
329(1)
§ 14.6 Traditional methodology and experimental philosophy
330(2)
§ 14.7 Philosophy and the quotidian
332(3)
References 335(16)
Index 351
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of British Columbia; he did his graduate work at Brown University and Rutgers University and post-doctoral work at the Arché Research Centre in St Andrews. He works primarily in epistemology and philosophical methodology; he has written papers on dreaming, imagination, knowledge and knowledge attributions, intuitions, and experimental philosophy. ; Benjamin W. Jarvis received his PhD in philosophy from Brown University in 2010, taking up a permanent lectureship in philosophy at Queen's University Belfast that same year. He works primarily in epistemology and the philosophy of mind and cognitive science and has published papers on belief, mental representation, knowledge, and truth.