| Preface |
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xi | |
| Introduction: Objective Rules of Thought |
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1 | (14) |
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§1 Philosophical anti-exceptionalisin |
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3 | (2) |
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§2 Pure rational thinking |
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5 | (2) |
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§3 Philosophical traditionalism |
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7 | (2) |
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§4 Experiential rationalism |
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9 | (1) |
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§5 The intersubjective validity and objectivity of rational inquiry |
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10 | (5) |
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Part I Propositions, Fregean Sense, and Rational Modality |
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1 A Fregean Theory of Prepositional Attitudes |
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15 | (32) |
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§1.1 Propositions as structures of concepts |
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15 | (2) |
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17 | (2) |
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§1.3 Use and representational content |
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19 | (2) |
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§1.4 The language of thought |
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21 | (1) |
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§1.5 Conclusive rational relations |
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22 | (1) |
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§1.6 Trouble from the Preface Paradox? |
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23 | (1) |
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§1.7 Proof and refutation |
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24 | (2) |
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26 | (3) |
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§1.9 An alternative theory of Fregean senses |
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29 | (3) |
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§1.10 Distinguishing senses of "rational commitment" |
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32 | (3) |
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§1.11 Realizing propositional attitudes |
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35 | (4) |
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§1.12 Rules and rationality |
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39 | (3) |
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§1.13 Conclusive rationality and defeasibility |
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42 | (5) |
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2 A Theory of Rational Modality |
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47 | (28) |
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47 | (3) |
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§2.2 Rational possibility and other family notions |
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50 | (2) |
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§2.3 Rational and metaphysical entailment |
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52 | (1) |
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§2.4 Coherence and rational modality |
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53 | (1) |
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§2.5 Rationally possible scenarios and truth conditions |
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54 | (1) |
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§2.6 Rational entailment and revision |
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55 | (3) |
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§2.7 R-Possibility, "epistemic possibility," and neo-Russellianism |
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58 | (3) |
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§2.8 The rationality version of Frege's puzzle |
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61 | (4) |
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§2.9 R-Possibility and Frege's puzzle |
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65 | (2) |
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§2.10 Kripke's "A Puzzle about Belief" and Frege's puzzle |
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67 | (1) |
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§2.11 David Chalmers's "epistemic possibilities" |
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68 | (1) |
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§2.12 Against two-dimensionalism |
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69 | (6) |
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3 The Psychological Realization of Fregean Sense |
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75 | (33) |
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75 | (1) |
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§3.2 Quinean revisability |
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75 | (2) |
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77 | (2) |
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§3.4 "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" |
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79 | (2) |
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§3.5 The psychological reality of rational entailment |
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81 | (5) |
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§3.6 Our theory of psychological reality contrasted: Peacocke |
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86 | (1) |
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§3.7 Our theory of psychological reality contrasted: Davidson |
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87 | (2) |
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§3.8 Our theory of the psychological reality of rational entailment recapitulated |
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89 | (1) |
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§3.9 General second-order inferential competencies |
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90 | (3) |
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93 | (2) |
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§3.11 Indeterminate rational relations |
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95 | (2) |
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§3.12 Kripke and proper names |
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97 | (3) |
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§3.13 Indeterminate singular concepts |
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100 | (2) |
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§3.14 Fregean sense, descriptivism, and conceptual role |
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102 | (3) |
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§3.15 Non-intentional rule-following |
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105 | (3) |
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4 The Sociability of a Fregean Theory |
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108 | (24) |
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§4.1 Social anti-individualism |
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109 | (1) |
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§4.2 Analyticity and social anti-individualism |
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110 | (1) |
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§4.3 The publicity of propositions and concepts |
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111 | (2) |
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113 | (2) |
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§4.5 Deferential and non-deferential concept possession |
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115 | (2) |
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117 | (1) |
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§4.7 Timothy Williamson on conceptual truths |
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118 | (2) |
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§4.8 Conceptual refinement |
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120 | (1) |
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§4.9 Socially externalizing rationality |
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121 | (4) |
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§4.10 Prepositional attitude ascriptions and testimony |
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125 | (3) |
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§4.11 A naive neo-Russellian theory of prepositional attitude ascriptions |
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128 | (4) |
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132 | (29) |
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§5.1 The minimalist explanation |
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133 | (1) |
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§5.2 Inherent and essential rational relations |
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134 | (2) |
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§5.3 Reductive strategies |
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136 | (1) |
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§5.4 Reduction, factorization, and analysis |
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137 | (2) |
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§5.5 Boghossian and concept possession |
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139 | (4) |
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§5.6 Peacocke and metasemantics |
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143 | (4) |
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§5.7 Wright, Enoch and Schechter, and pragmatism |
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147 | (7) |
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§5.8 Field and evaluativism |
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154 | (7) |
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Part II Rationality, Apriority, and Philosophy |
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6 A Theory of the A Priori |
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161 | (18) |
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§6.1 Apriority and propositional justification |
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162 | (2) |
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§6.2 An alternative approach: Albert Casullo |
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164 | (1) |
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§6.3 A priori transitions in thought |
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165 | (1) |
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§6.4 Experience in a warranting role |
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166 | (3) |
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§6.5 Experience and d-justification |
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169 | (1) |
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§6.6 Apriority and r-necessity |
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170 | (1) |
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§6.7 Apriority and empirical indefeasibility* |
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171 | (3) |
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§6.8 Is apriority homogeneous? |
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174 | (2) |
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§6.9 Is our theory of the a priori vacuous? |
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176 | (1) |
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§6.10 The nature of experience |
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177 | (2) |
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7 A Priori Philosophy: Responses to Objections |
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179 | (19) |
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§7.1 A posteriori knowledge of a priori faculties |
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179 | (2) |
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§7.2 Limiting the challenge: Non-basic methods? |
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181 | (3) |
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§7.3 Knowledge and knowledge of knowledge |
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184 | (2) |
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§7.4 A priori reliability of a priori methods |
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186 | (1) |
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§7.5 Philosophy and knowledge of philosophical abilities |
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187 | (1) |
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§7.6 Thought-experiments and the quotidian |
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188 | (1) |
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§7.7 Perceptual faculties in imagination |
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189 | (2) |
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§7.8 Peeking as self-experimentation? |
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191 | (3) |
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§7.9 Misleading "a priori" feelings |
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194 | (4) |
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8 The Content of Thought-Experiment Judgments |
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198 | (18) |
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§8.1 Formalizing thought-experiment arguments: Necessity? |
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199 | (2) |
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§8.2 Timothy Williamson's counterfactual formulation |
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201 | (1) |
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§8.3 Against the counterfactual formulation |
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202 | (1) |
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203 | (1) |
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§8.5 Thought-experiments as fictions |
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204 | (2) |
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§8.6 Fictions fixing content |
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206 | (3) |
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§8.7 Disanalogies between thought-experiments and fictions? |
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209 | (3) |
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§8.8 Reasoning and thought-experiments |
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212 | (1) |
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§8.9 Other argumentative roles for thought-experiments |
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213 | (1) |
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§8.10 Non-argumentative roles for thought-experiments |
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214 | (2) |
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9 The Epistemology of Thought-Experiment Judgments |
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216 | (15) |
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§9.1 Content and inferential competencies |
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217 | (1) |
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§9.2 Reliability and knowledge about imaginary scenarios |
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218 | (3) |
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221 | (3) |
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§9.4 Knowledge of necessity |
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224 | (1) |
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§9.5 Categorization and apriority |
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225 | (1) |
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§9.6 On conceptual analysis |
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226 | (5) |
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10 Rational Imagination and Modal Epistemology |
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231 | (30) |
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§10.1 Imagination as supposition |
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232 | (2) |
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§10.2 Imagination and possibility |
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234 | (1) |
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§10.3 Coherent imagination |
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235 | (1) |
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§10.4 Rational imagination |
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236 | (3) |
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§10.5 Defeasible inference in imagination |
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239 | (1) |
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§10.6 R-miodality and metaphysical modality |
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240 | (2) |
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§10.7 The coherent impossible |
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242 | (1) |
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§10.8 From rational to metaphysical possibility |
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243 | (3) |
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246 | (1) |
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§10.10 Mathematical truths |
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247 | (1) |
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§10.11 A priori knowledge of rational modality |
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248 | (2) |
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250 | (11) |
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Appendix A The misidentification response |
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252 | (3) |
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255 | (6) |
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Part III Intuitions and Philosophy |
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11 The Nature of Intuitions |
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261 | (13) |
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262 | (1) |
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263 | (1) |
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§11.3 The robust picture of intuitions |
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264 | (1) |
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§11.4 Williamson on phenomenology |
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265 | (2) |
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§11.5 Earlenbaugh and Molyneux |
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267 | (4) |
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§11.6 Reductionism without insignificance |
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271 | (3) |
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12 Against Strong Experiential Rationalism |
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274 | (27) |
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§12.1 Strong experiential rationalism |
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275 | (2) |
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§12.2 Intuitions and evidence |
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277 | (2) |
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§12.3 Evidence concerning the psychological |
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279 | (2) |
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§12.4 Blind irrationality |
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281 | (1) |
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§12.5 What you can't see, can't rationally constrain you? |
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282 | (2) |
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§12.6 The intersubjective validity of rational norms |
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284 | (1) |
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§12.7 The objectivity of rational norms |
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285 | (3) |
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§12.8 Reliabilist strong experiential rationalism |
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288 | (2) |
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§12.9 Against phenomenal conservatism |
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290 | (4) |
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§12.10 Against general foundationalism |
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294 | (1) |
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§12.11 Against subjective foundationalism |
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295 | (2) |
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§12.12 Intuitions and evidence revisited |
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297 | (2) |
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§12.13 Intuitions and purely rational inquiry |
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299 | (2) |
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13 Intuition as a Source of Evidence? |
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301 | (18) |
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301 | (2) |
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§13.2 Blind irrationality reconsidered |
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303 | (1) |
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§13.3 Epistemology and psychology |
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304 | (3) |
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§13.4 Apriority and the "New Evil Demon" problem |
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307 | (2) |
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§13.5 Perceptual justification and the Problem of the Speckled Hen |
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309 | (3) |
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§13.6 Failure of justified belief |
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312 | (2) |
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§13.7 Intuiting and perceiving compared |
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314 | (1) |
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§13.8 Intuiting and perceiving contrasted |
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315 | (2) |
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§13.9 The Benacerraf-Field challenge |
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317 | (2) |
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14 Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Methodology |
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319 | (16) |
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§14.1 Positive experimental philosophy |
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319 | (3) |
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§14.2 Negative experimental philosophy |
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322 | (2) |
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§14.3 The use of intuitions in philosophy |
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324 | (1) |
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§14.4 The critique generalized? |
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325 | (4) |
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§14.5 Epistemology and methodology |
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329 | (1) |
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§14.6 Traditional methodology and experimental philosophy |
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330 | (2) |
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§14.7 Philosophy and the quotidian |
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332 | (3) |
| References |
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335 | (16) |
| Index |
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351 | |
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