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x | |
Acknowledgments |
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xi | |
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xii | |
Legal Cases |
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xiv | |
Resolutions, Statutes, and Treaties |
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xix | |
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1 Progress and Pushback in the Judicialization of Human Rights |
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1 | (34) |
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1 | (5) |
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Resistance, Resentment, and Retrenchment in Global Politics |
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6 | (1) |
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How International Human Rights and Criminal Tribunals Work: Authority in Context |
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7 | (11) |
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18 | (6) |
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Operationalizing Backlash: Extraordinary and Ordinary Politics |
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24 | (8) |
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32 | (3) |
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2 Backlash in Theoretical Context |
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35 | (27) |
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35 | (3) |
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Dependence on States and the Courts' Susceptibility to Subversion |
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38 | (3) |
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Normative Discontent: Debating Human Rights Norms |
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41 | (7) |
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International Courts, Domestic Consequences |
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48 | (5) |
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Blinding the Watchdog: Anticipating Future Violence |
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53 | (2) |
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Backlash, but Which Form? |
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55 | (2) |
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Methodological Approach and Case Selection |
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57 | (4) |
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61 | (1) |
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3 The Politics of Withdrawal |
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62 | (26) |
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62 | (1) |
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Explaining Withdrawals from Internationa] Human Rights and Criminal Courts |
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63 | (2) |
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Mapping the Scope of Withdrawal |
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65 | (2) |
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Case Selection and Empirical Approach |
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67 | (2) |
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Case 1 Peru and the (Mostly) Realized Withdrawal |
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69 | (8) |
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Case 2 Venezuela's Realized Withdrawal(s) |
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77 | (7) |
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Case 3 Colombia's Different Path |
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84 | (2) |
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86 | (2) |
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4 Replacing the International Justice Regime |
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88 | (24) |
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88 | (1) |
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Why Alternative Justice Mechanisms as a Form of Backlash? |
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89 | (3) |
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Case Selection and Empirical Approach |
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92 | (1) |
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Case is The African Union's Plan for the ICC |
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93 | (14) |
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Case 2 The Latin American Experience |
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107 | (4) |
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111 | (1) |
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5 Bureaucrats, Budgets, and Backlash: Death by a Thousand Paper Cuts |
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112 | (21) |
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112 | (1) |
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Budgets and Bureaucracies as Sites of Backlash |
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113 | (3) |
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Case Selection and Empirical Approach |
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116 | (1) |
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Case 1 Reforms and Restrictions as a Canary in the Coal Mine for the IAHRS |
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117 | (7) |
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Case 2 Political Crises and Bureaucratic and Budgetary Conflicts at the ICC |
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124 | (7) |
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131 | (2) |
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6 Doctrinal Challenges: Diluting the Domestic Impacts of International Adjudication |
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133 | (25) |
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133 | (1) |
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From Whence Doctrinal Challenges? |
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134 | (2) |
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Regional Courts, the Margin of Appreciation, and the Concept of Subsidiarity |
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136 | (2) |
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Case Selection and Empirical Approach |
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138 | (1) |
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Case 1 Russia, the ECtHR, and Protocol 14 of the ECHR |
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139 | (12) |
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Case 2 Domestic Dramas, International Reforms, and ECtHR Supporter States |
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151 | (5) |
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156 | (2) |
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7 How to Save the International Justice Regime |
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158 | (25) |
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158 | (1) |
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How to Save the International Justice Regime |
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159 | (18) |
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Review of the Main Argument and Pathways for Future Research |
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177 | (4) |
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Law Is Preferable to War: Save the International Justice Regime! |
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181 | (2) |
Appendix |
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183 | (4) |
Select Bibliography |
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187 | (41) |
Index |
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228 | |