Preface |
|
iii | |
|
|
ix | |
|
|
xi | |
Summary |
|
xiii | |
Acknowledgments |
|
xix | |
Glossary |
|
xxi | |
|
Sustainment of Army Units in OIF |
|
|
1 | (18) |
|
Sustainment Performance in OIF |
|
|
3 | (4) |
|
A Joint Supply Chain Vision |
|
|
7 | (7) |
|
Tactical Supply Operations |
|
|
8 | (2) |
|
|
10 | (1) |
|
|
10 | (2) |
|
Theater General Support Stockage |
|
|
12 | (1) |
|
National Supply Management |
|
|
13 | (1) |
|
|
13 | (1) |
|
|
14 | (4) |
|
Organization of This Report |
|
|
18 | (1) |
|
Tactical Supply Operations |
|
|
19 | (18) |
|
A Few Basic Army Inventory Metrics and Terms |
|
|
19 | (2) |
|
Prepositioned ASL Breadth: Did the Army Preposition the Right Parts? |
|
|
21 | (4) |
|
ASLs Deployed from CONUS Had Better Part Mixes |
|
|
25 | (3) |
|
ASLs Were Quickly Depleted |
|
|
28 | (2) |
|
Part Ordering During Combat Operations |
|
|
30 | (2) |
|
|
32 | (5) |
|
|
37 | (22) |
|
Insufficient Cargo Truck Capacity During Major Combat Operations |
|
|
38 | (5) |
|
The Planned Cargo Truck Requirement and Availability |
|
|
38 | (2) |
|
|
40 | (1) |
|
Unanticipated Demands for Cargo Truck Capacity |
|
|
41 | (1) |
|
Factors That Reduced the Effective Capacity of Available Trucks |
|
|
42 | (1) |
|
Divisional Adaptation to Shortfalls in Cargo Truck Capacity |
|
|
43 | (1) |
|
Supply Levels During Combat Operations |
|
|
44 | (6) |
|
Capacity Devoted Almost Entirely to Food, Water, and Ammunition |
|
|
48 | (1) |
|
Ammunition Supply During Combat Operations |
|
|
48 | (2) |
|
Fuel Supplies Remained Robust |
|
|
50 | (4) |
|
Theater Preparatory Tasks |
|
|
50 | (1) |
|
Planning and Resourcing Refueling Operations |
|
|
51 | (2) |
|
Differences Between the Fuel and Other Supply Chains |
|
|
53 | (1) |
|
The Pause in the Advance at Objective RAMS |
|
|
54 | (2) |
|
|
56 | (3) |
|
|
59 | (20) |
|
|
60 | (2) |
|
The Sources of Delays for CCP-Built Pallets |
|
|
62 | (2) |
|
|
64 | (10) |
|
|
65 | (3) |
|
|
68 | (2) |
|
|
70 | (1) |
|
The Benefits of SSA-Pure Multipacks and Pallets |
|
|
70 | (4) |
|
CONUS Distribution Center/CCP Capacity |
|
|
74 | (2) |
|
|
76 | (3) |
|
National- and Theater-Level Inventory |
|
|
79 | (22) |
|
Backorder Rate for Army-Managed Items |
|
|
80 | (2) |
|
|
82 | (2) |
|
Army Prepositioned Sustainment Stocks |
|
|
84 | (8) |
|
|
84 | (7) |
|
CONUS-Based War Reserve Sustainment Stocks |
|
|
91 | (1) |
|
Determining and Resourcing National-Level Requirements for Spare Parts |
|
|
92 | (5) |
|
|
97 | (4) |
|
|
101 | (6) |
|
Limited Situational Awareness During Combat Operations |
|
|
101 | (2) |
|
The Monitoring and Control of Processes |
|
|
103 | (1) |
|
|
104 | (3) |
|
Implications for the Future |
|
|
107 | (16) |
|
|
107 | (2) |
|
Requirements of Distributed Operations with Long LOCs |
|
|
107 | (1) |
|
Low Supply Levels in Maneuver Brigades Produced a Strong Sense of Risk |
|
|
108 | (1) |
|
Units Employed a Combat Readiness Standard |
|
|
109 | (1) |
|
The Breadth of Equipment in Current BCTs Makes Effective Support Challenging |
|
|
109 | (1) |
|
Improving the Logistics System for Current and Future Forces |
|
|
109 | (4) |
|
A Logistics System that Has Transformed in Concept but Is Still in Transition |
|
|
113 | (2) |
|
|
|
A. Outline of Recommendations |
|
|
115 | (6) |
|
|
121 | (2) |
References |
|
123 | |