Update cookies preferences

Administrative Monopoly In China: Causes, Behaviors, And Termination [Hardback]

(Unirule Inst Of Economics, China), (The Unirule Inst Of Economics & Law Sch Of People's Public Security Univ Of China, China), (Unirule Inst Of Economics, China & Chinese Academy Of Social Sciences, China)
  • Format: Hardback, 416 pages
  • Series: Series on Chinese Economics Research 10
  • Pub. Date: 29-Apr-2015
  • Publisher: World Scientific Publishing Co Pte Ltd
  • ISBN-10: 9814611069
  • ISBN-13: 9789814611060
Other books in subject:
  • Hardback
  • Price: 179,65 €
  • This book is not in stock. Book will arrive in about 2-4 weeks. Please allow another 2 weeks for shipping outside Estonia.
  • Quantity:
  • Add to basket
  • Delivery time 4-6 weeks
  • Add to Wishlist
Administrative Monopoly In China: Causes, Behaviors, And TerminationLarger Image
  • Format: Hardback, 416 pages
  • Series: Series on Chinese Economics Research 10
  • Pub. Date: 29-Apr-2015
  • Publisher: World Scientific Publishing Co Pte Ltd
  • ISBN-10: 9814611069
  • ISBN-13: 9789814611060
Other books in subject:
Permanent link: https://www.kriso.lv/db/9789814611060.html
Administrative Monopoly in China: Causes, Behaviors, and Termination is a further work of our previous book, China's State-Owned Enterprises: Nature, Performance and Reform. This new book analyzes the SOEs with respect to monopoly, and focuses on six industries: telecommunication, petroleum, railway, salt, banking and football.The book tells the history of how administrative monopolies were formed in China, analyzes the factors responsible for this, describes the behaviors of administrative monopoly, enterprises, and individuals against the monopolistic background, and presents data on the losses brought about by the administrative monopolies.
Abstract xxi
Introduction xxiii
Chapter 1 Nature of Administrative Monopolies 1(10)
1 Definition of Administrative Monopoly
1(1)
2 Composition of Administrative Monopoly
2(2)
2.1 Use of public powers mainly by administrative departments
2(1)
2.2 Establishment of monopoly status
3(1)
2.3 The main actor in administrative monopoly
4(1)
3 Administrative Monopolies vs. Market Monopolies
4(2)
3.1 Formation of the monopoly
5(1)
3.2 Use of public power
5(1)
3.3 Potential competition
5(1)
4 Constitutional Characteristics of Administrative Monopoly
6(2)
5 Main Forms of Administrative Monopoly
8(3)
5.1 Establishment of barriers to entry
8(1)
5.2 Price regulations on products sold by the monopolist
9(1)
5.3 Preferential prices on input purchases
9(1)
5.4 Promotion of mergers leading to monopolies
10(1)
5.5 Barriers on the movement of products and resources between regions
10(1)
Chapter 2 Formation and Cause of Administrative Monopolies 11(20)
1 Formation and Evolution of Administrative Monopolies
11(7)
1.1 Formation and evolution of administrative monopolies in the telecom industry
11(2)
1.2 Formation and evolution of administrative monopolies in the oil industry
13(2)
1.3 Formation and evolution of administrative monopolies in the banking industry
15(2)
1.4 Formation and evolution of administrative monopolies in the table salt industry
17(1)
2 The Inertia of the Planned Economy
18(1)
3 Absence of Fiscal Pressure on Central Government for Reform
19(1)
4 The Market Value of Administrative Monopolies and the Formation of Self-Aware Monopoly Interest Groups
20(3)
5 In-House Lobbying
23(3)
6 "Departmental Legislation"
26(5)
Chapter 3 Pervasiveness of Administrative Monopolies 31(22)
1 Allocation of Administrative Monopolies in Industries
31(2)
2 Administrative Monopolies in the Telecommunications Industry
33(5)
2.1 Designated operators
33(1)
2.2 Entrance thresholds
34(1)
2.3 Price regulations
35(1)
2.4 Market structure in broadband
36(1)
2.5 Market structure for mobile phones and fixed lines
37(1)
3 Administrative Monopoly in the Oil Industry
38(4)
3.1 Legal status of administrative monopoly
38(3)
3.1.1 Administrative monopoly in the upstream extraction process
38(2)
3.1.2 Administrative monopolies in the mid-stream refinery process
40(1)
3.1.3 Administrative monopolies in wholesale refined oil
40(1)
3.1.4 Administrative monopolies in the supply and delivery process
40(1)
3.1.5 Administrative monopolies in the importing of crude oil
41(1)
3.1.6 Administrative monopoly in oil reserves
41(1)
3.2 Market structure
41(1)
4 Administrative Monopoly in the Railway Industry
42(2)
5 Administrative Monopoly in the Banking Industry
44(2)
5.1 Interest rate regulations
45(1)
5.2 Market structure
45(1)
6 Administrative Monopoly in the Salt Industry
46(3)
6.1 Legal status of administrative monopoly in the salt industry
46(2)
6.2 Monopoly structure of the table salt industry
48(1)
6.3 Monopoly prices in the table salt industry
48(1)
7 Administrative Monopoly in the Football Industry
49(2)
7.1 Exclusive status of sports associations
49(1)
7.2 Powers of sport associations
50(3)
7.2.1 Decisions over eligibility
50(1)
7.2.2 Discipline and punishment
50(1)
7.2.3 Management and organization of competitions
50(1)
7.2.4 Ownership and usufruct of leagues
50(1)
8 Administrative Monopolies in Localities
51(2)
Chapter 4 Illegality of Administrative Monopolies 53(12)
1 Lack of Legal Authorization and Violation of the Principle of Legal Reservation
53(12)
1.1 Authorization with only administrative documents
54(2)
1.2 Overreach of authorization from lower-level documents
56(1)
1.3 Unclear and abnormally high entrance requirements specified by laws
57(8)
1.3.1 Stipulations too vague, providing too much discretionary power
58(3)
1.3.2 Excessively high entrance requirements
61(1)
1.3.3 Laws inappropriate and unconstitutional
62(3)
Chapter 5 Administrative Monopoly Behaviors 65(20)
1 Classification of Administrative Monopoly Behaviors
65(3)
1.1 Action by administrative departments to create administrative monopolies
65(1)
1.2 Administrative monopoly behaviors by enterprises
66(1)
1.3 Individual behaviors caused by administrative monopoly
67(1)
2 Examples of Administrative Monopoly Behavior in Departments
68(9)
2.1 Setting institutional barriers to entry
68(3)
2.2 Creating direct price regulations or product pricings that are beneficial to administrative monopoly enterprises
71(1)
2.3 Leading and pushing mergers in order to increase the centralization of industries
72(2)
2.4 Offering preferential policies in areas such as taxation, lands, fees for utilizing natural resources, and profit remittances to large-scale SOEs such as central SOEs
74(1)
2.5 Offering aid to monopoly enterprises through refinancing, asset restructuring, and debt divestitures
75(1)
2.6 Offering enterprises import monopoly concessions for resources (such as crude oil, iron ores, etc.)
75(1)
2.7 Granting administrative monopoly status in transportation
76(1)
2.8 Violating the Price Law by not holding hearings for the determination or adjustment of prices, or holding hearings with obvious procedural flaws
76(1)
2.9 Offering enterprises portions of administrative powers
77(1)
3 Examples of the Administrative Monopoly Behaviors by Enterprises
77(5)
3.1 Setting high prices or influencing the setting of prices for products or services (including long-distance calls, broadband, and gasoline), or implementing price discrimination
77(2)
3.2 Controlling the sales network or channels of products
79(1)
3.3 Implementing unfair competition or sales practices such as bundle sales or cross-subsidization
80(1)
3.4 Implementing unfair competition by cross-subsidization, and cheating the government out of subsidies
80(1)
3.5 Conspiring to create price cartels with other monopolists, often in the name of self-regulation
81(1)
3.6 Extending the monopoly in one production stage to its upstream and downstream stages to gain preferential conditions there as well
81(1)
4 Examples of Individual or Organizational Behaviors Caused by Administrative Monopolies
82(3)
4.1 Direct benefits from the power over establishing administrative monopolies, such as bribery
82(1)
4.2 Gaining a portion of monopoly rents through advantageous purchase prices for or from one's own enterprise
83(1)
4.3 Using the shortage caused by the administrative monopoly to monopolize the sales of parts of the products, profiting from abnormally high prices
83(2)
Chapter 6 Inefficiency and Unfairness of Administrative Monopoly 85(14)
1 Inefficiency and Unfairness of Setting Barriers to Entry
85(4)
1.1 Administrative monopoly model for barriers to entry
85(3)
1.2 Reasonable institutional barriers to entry
88(1)
2 The Inefficiency and Unfairness of Regulation of Sales Prices
89(1)
3 Purchase-Price Regulation: Resources Sold at Low Prices or Given away for Free
90(2)
4 Affecting the Neutrality of Macroeconomic Policies
92(4)
4.1 The distribution distortion brought by administrative monopolies generates inflation
92(1)
4.2 Tendency to adopt expansionary fiscal policies
92(1)
4.3 Monetary policy favors adjusting deposit reserve requirements rather than interest rates
93(3)
5 Damage to Social Justice
96(1)
6 Damage to Political Legitimacy and Moral Values
97(2)
Chapter 7 Estimation of Welfare Loss and Distribution Distortions Caused by Administrative Monopolies 99(26)
1 Measuring Methods of Welfare Loss and Distribution Distortions Caused by Administrative Monopolies
99(9)
1.1 Several aspects of net social welfare losses and distribution distortions
99(3)
1.2 Approximation method of social welfare losses: The Harberger triangle
102(1)
1.3 Approximation method of distribution distortions and social welfare losses caused by regulations on sales prices for monopolists
102(1)
1.4 Approximation method of distribution distortions and social welfare losses caused by regulated purchase prices for monopolists
103(1)
1.5 Different kinds of social welfare losses
103(1)
1.6 Approximation method of resource allocation losses
104(1)
1.7 Methods for a quantitative approximation of the inflation effect of administrative monopolies
105(1)
1.8 Methods for approximating income transfers resulting from adjustments to reserve requirements instead of interest rates
105(3)
2 Estimation of Welfare Loss and Distribution Distortions Caused by Administrative Monopolies
108(10)
2.1 Estimation of the social welfare loss I (narrow-bore)
109(1)
2.1.1 Telecommunications industry
109(1)
2.1.2 Oil industry
110(1)
2.2 Estimation of social welfare loss II (monopoly profits)
110(1)
2.2.1 Telecommunications industry
110(1)
2.2.2 Oil industry
110(1)
2.2.3 Table salt industry
111(1)
2.3 Estimation of the social welfare loss III (losses for resource owners)
111(7)
2.3.1 Petroleum industry
111(2)
2.3.2 The banking industry
113(1)
2.3.3 The approximation of loss from misallocation of resources
114(2)
2.3.4 The inflation effect of administrative monopolies
116(1)
2.3.5 Distribution distortion and welfare losses from adjusting reserve requirements instead of interest rates
117(1)
2.3.6 Summation of social welfare losses in the industries studied
118(1)
3 Real Performance and Income Distribution of Administrative Monopolists
118(7)
3.1 Real performance
119(1)
3.1.1 Telecommunications industry
119(1)
3.1.2 Petroleum industry
119(1)
3.1.3 Banking industry
120(1)
3.2 Income distribution
120(23)
3.2.1 Telecommunications industry
120(2)
3.2.2 Petroleum industry
122(3)
Chapter 8 Breaking Administrative Monopoly 125(18)
1 Existing Anti-Monopoly Laws
125(4)
2 The Constitutional Level: Restricting and Forbidding Departmental Legislation
129(3)
3 The Constitutional Level: Effective Control of the State Economy and SOEs
132(2)
4 Utilizing Existing Constitutional and Legal Resources, Clearing Out Documents Establishing Administrative Monopolies
134(2)
5 Toward a Legal and Judicial Anti-Monopoly System
136(5)
6 Breaking Administrative Monopoly by Administrative Means
141(2)
Sub-Report 1: Administrative Monopoly in the Telecommunications Industry 143(36)
1 History of Administrative Monopoly in the Telecommunications Industry
143(7)
1.1 The Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications: Administrator, enterprise and monopolist (1979-1994)
143(3)
1.2 China Unicorn formed, administrative monopoly by the "Big Two" in the telecom market (1994-1998)
146(2)
1.3 Obstacles to competition under the management of the Ministry of the Information Industry (Later renamed the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology) (1998—present)
148(2)
2 Legal Status of Administrative Monopoly in the Telecommunications Industry
150(4)
2.1 Designated operators
150(1)
2.2 Entrance thresholds
151(1)
2.3 Price regulations
152(2)
3 Market Structure of the Telecom Industry
154(3)
3.1 Broadband interne connection
154(2)
3.2 Mobile market and fixed-line market
156(1)
3.3 A measure of barriers to entry
156(1)
4 Behavior of Administrative Monopolists in the Telecommunications Industry
157(9)
4.1 Administrative departments setting up and maintaining administrative monopolies
157(3)
4.1.1 Opposition to China Unicom's entry
157(2)
4.1.2 Guiding the restructuring of enterprises
159(1)
4.2 Profit behavior by enterprises using administrative monopoly
160(4)
4.2.1 Discriminatory inter-network rates
160(2)
4.2.2 Monopoly prices
162(1)
4.2.3 Rent-seeking
163(1)
4.3 Individual or institutional behaviors induced by administrative monopoly
164(2)
4.3.1 Direct abuses of administrative power to grant monopolies
164(1)
4.3.2 Corruption through front companies
165(1)
5 Social Welfare Losses
166(9)
5.1 Net welfare losses for society
167(1)
5.1.1 Estimation of the lower bound
167(1)
5.1.2 Estimations of the upper bound
168(1)
5.2 Underestimated costs
168(3)
5.2.1 Land rentals
168(1)
5.2.2 Auction of telecom phone number resources
168(3)
5.3 Welfare losses
171(1)
5.4 Income distribution in administrative monopolies
171(4)
5.4.1 Industry salary and benefits
171(3)
5.4.2 Executive pay
174(1)
6 Reasons for the Formation of Administrative Monopoly in the Telecom Industry
175(4)
6.1 System-wide inertia
175(1)
6.2 Reinforcement of monopoly by administrative authorities
176(1)
6.3 Financial demands from the central government
176(1)
6.4 In-house lobbying
177(2)
Sub-Report 2: Administrative Monopoly in the Oil Industry 179(40)
1 Market Structure of the Oil Industry
179(1)
1.1 Proportion of state-owned assets
179(1)
1.2 Market structure
179(1)
2 Formation and Evolution of the Administrative Monopoly in the Oil Industry
180(3)
3 Characteristics and Legal Status of Administrative Monopoly in the Oil Industry
183(9)
3.1 Administrative monopoly in the upstream oil exploitation sector
184(4)
3.1.1 Granting the Big Three their monopolies
184(2)
3.1.2 Strict entry approval system
186(1)
3.1.3 Support given to state-owned capital
187(1)
3.2 Administrative monopoly in the midstream refining and chemical sector
188(1)
3.3 Administrative monopoly in the downstream refined oil markets
188(1)
3.4 Administrative monopoly in the supply and distribution sector
189(1)
3.5 Administrative monopoly in the crude oil import sector
190(1)
3.6 Administrative monopoly in the oil reserve sector
191(1)
4 Causes of Administrative Monopoly
192(3)
4.1 Inertia of the planned economy
192(1)
4.2 Ideological misconception
192(1)
4.3 Maximization of the central government's fiscal revenue
193(2)
4.4 In-house lobbying
195(1)
5 Administrative Monopoly Behaviors
195(10)
5.1 Administrative departments setting up and maintaining administrative monopolies
195(3)
5.1.1 Expanding powers through departmental regulations
195(1)
5.1.2 Consolidating monopoly positions through preferential policies
196(1)
5.1.3 Adopting the pricing mechanism in favor of the monopoly enterprises
197(1)
5.2 Profit seeking behaviors of enterprises through administrative monopoly
198(5)
5.2.1 Controlling the sales channels
198(1)
5.2.2 Squeezing the profit of private enterprises through cross-subsidization
199(1)
5.2.3 Contending for favorable locations for gas stations
200(1)
5.2.4 Eliminating competitors by administrative means
201(1)
5.2.5 Using resource advantages to extend monopoly powers downstream
202(1)
5.3 Rent-seeking behaviors of individuals
203(2)
6 Welfare Loss and Distribution Distortion
205(12)
6.1 Net social welfare loss
205(1)
6.2 Understated cost
205(8)
6.2.1 Underpayment of rent for industrial land
205(1)
6.2.2 Underpayment of the rent on land for gas stations
206(1)
6.2.3 Underpayment of resource rent
207(2)
6.2.4 Government subsidies
209(1)
6.2.5 Financing costs below market levels
209(1)
6.2.6 Welfare loss caused by monopoly prices
210(3)
6.3 Welfare loss
213(1)
6.4 Distribution
214(3)
6.4.1 Wages
214(1)
6.4.2 Executive compensation
215(1)
6.4.3 Others
215(2)
6.5 Summary
217(1)
Appendices
217(2)
Sub-Report 3: Administrative Monopoly in the Railway Industry 219(50)
1 Formation and Evolution of Administrative Monopoly in the Railway Industry
219(5)
2 Manifestation of the Administrative Monopoly
224(5)
2.1 Barriers to entry
224(2)
2.2 Price control
226(3)
2.2.1 Price control for ordinary trains
226(1)
2.2.2 Price control for high-speed railways
227(2)
3 Efficiency Analysis of Railway Investment
229(11)
3.1 Manifestation and causes of the investment deviation
229(5)
3.2 Estimated social welfare loss caused by the misallocation of the railway resources
234(4)
3.3 Logical errors in the large-scale investment in high-speed railway
238(2)
4 Safety on High-speed Railways
240(8)
4.1 The accident
241(2)
4.2 Rescue operations following the accident
243(1)
4.3 Handling of the accident
244(3)
4.3.1 Responsible individuals
244(1)
4.3.2 Responses to the accident
245(1)
4.3.3 Speed and price reductions
246(1)
4.4 Problems with the investigation report
247(1)
5 Monopoly Behavior and Rent-Seeking
248(12)
5.1 Monopoly behavior
248(4)
5.1.1 Bundled sales
248(1)
5.1.2 Railway passenger insurance
248(4)
5.2 Rent-seeking
252(4)
5.2.1 Scalpers
253(1)
5.2.2 Institutional rent-seekers
254(2)
5.3 Unconstrained administrative power
256(13)
5.3.1 A kingdom with its own judicial system
256(1)
5.3.2 Lack of accountability in the system
257(1)
5.3.3 Poor information transparency
258(2)
6 Zhang Shuguang's Case: A Classic Case of Using Monopoly Powers for Rent-Seeking Activities
260(2)
Appendices
262(7)
Sub-Report 4: Administrative Monopoly in the Banking Industry 269(48)
1 Status Quo of the Banking Industry in China
269(1)
1.1 Overview of the banking industry
269(1)
2 History of the Banking Industry in China and Formation of its Administrative Monopoly
270(3)
2.1 Formation of the existing banking system in China
270(2)
2.2 Interest rate system
272(1)
2.3 Market access system
273(1)
3 Manifestation of Administrative Monopoly in the Banking Industry
273(14)
3.1 Administrative department appointment of bank management
274(2)
3.2 Problems of bank supervision bodies: Inadequate effectiveness and independence
276(2)
3.2.1 A look at the effectiveness and independence of financial supervision bodies, taking the China banking regulatory commission as an example
276(1)
3.2.2 Establishment and dissolution of the financial work committee under the CPC central committee
277(1)
3.3 Government support to state-owned banks: Picking up the bill on bad loans
278(1)
3.4 Control over market entry in the banking industry
279(5)
3.4.1 Evolution of private capital's entry into the banking industry
280(1)
3.4.2 Institutional barriers to the private banking industry
281(1)
3.4.3 Village banks and microcredit companies
282(2)
3.5 Interest rate control in the banking industry
284(2)
3.6 Banks taking advantage of their monopoly position
286(1)
4 Distribution Distortions and Welfare Loss Caused by Interest Rate Control and Banking Monopoly
287(6)
4.1 China's control over the interest spread and its impact on the balance sheets of banking institutions
287(2)
4.2 Dual distortions from interest rate controls
289(4)
5 Estimation of the Banking Industry's Actual Net Interest Income and the State-Owned Banks' Actual Performance
293(9)
5.1 A calculation that gives a true view of the net interest income of China's banking industry
293(4)
5.1.1 Nominal income from net interest in the banking industry in 2010
294(1)
5.1.2 Actual net interest income of the banking industry in 2010
295(2)
5.2 Efficiency of the banking industry under administrative monopoly
297(20)
5.2.1 Efficiency gap between China's listed banks
297(3)
5.2.2 Efficiency gap between the top 10 listed banks across the world
300(1)
5.2.3 Actual performance of state-owned banks
300(2)
6 Estimation of Distribution Distortion from Adjusting Reserve Requirements Rather than Interest Rates
302(10)
7 Conclusion
312(1)
Appendices
313(4)
Sub-Report 5: Administrative Monopoly in the Salt Industry 317(34)
1 Origin and Evolution of Administrative Monopoly in the Salt Industry
317(10)
1.1 Evolution of the salt industry
317(5)
1.2 Legal bases and related problems
322(5)
2 Organizational Structure
327(2)
3 Iodine Addition of Salt and Controlled Monopoly Prices
329(7)
3.1 Monopoly prices for edible salt
329(3)
3.2 More costly because of iodine addition?
332(1)
3.3 Large number of table salt production enterprises
333(1)
3.4 Overproduction of table salt
334(1)
3.5 Iodine addition to table salt: The awards are over but it will not leave the stage
335(1)
4 Production and Sale of Salt: A Two-Tiered Administrative Monopoly
336(7)
4.1 Inefficient allocation of resources in the salt industry
337(1)
4.2 Unjust, and harming private salt enterprises, upstream suppliers, and downstream consumers
337(2)
4.3 Rent-seeking and driving the supply of illegal table salt
339(2)
4.4 Income distribution under administrative monopoly —A case study of China National Salt Industry Corporation
341(1)
4.5 Extension of the monopoly power to the downstream industries
342(1)
5 International Experience
343(3)
5.1 The US
343(1)
5.2 Japan
344(1)
5.3 Comparison of the salt industries of China, the US and Japan
345(1)
6 Reform and Outlook
346(5)
Sub-Report 6: Administrative Monopoly in the Sports Industry: A Case Study of the Football Monopoly 351(18)
1 Position and Power of the Sports Industry Associations in China
352(3)
1.1 Exclusive position of sports industry associations
352(1)
1.2 Power of the sports industry associations
352(7)
1.2.1 Power over managing athlete eligibility and related decisions
352(1)
1.2.2 Power over discipline and punishments
353(1)
1.2.3 Power over organizing and managing sports events
353(1)
1.2.4 Ownership and rights to profit from league games
353(2)
2 Dominant Position of Sports Industry Associations
355(4)
3 Harm of the Administrative Monopoly in the Sports Industry
359(6)
3.1 Infringement of rights and curbing the enthusiasm of league investors
359(2)
3.2 Harming the quality of league games and obstructing long-term development
361(2)
3.3 Over-centralization of power leads to rent-seeking and rampant corruption
363(2)
4 Solutions
365(4)
Bibliography 369(10)
Index 379