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Game Theory and Climate Change [Hardback]

  • Format: Hardback, 344 pages, height x width: 229x152 mm, 19 b&w illustrations
  • Pub. Date: 03-Apr-2018
  • Publisher: Columbia University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0231184646
  • ISBN-13: 9780231184649
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  • Format: Hardback, 344 pages, height x width: 229x152 mm, 19 b&w illustrations
  • Pub. Date: 03-Apr-2018
  • Publisher: Columbia University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0231184646
  • ISBN-13: 9780231184649
Other books in subject:
Parkash Chander argues that we can make progress on the climate-change impasse through incorporating the insights of game theory. Chander offers economic and game-theoretic interpretations of both the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement and discusses the policy recommendations his framework generates.

Despite the growing consensus on the need for action to counteract climate change, complex economic and political forces have so far prevented international actors from making much headway toward resolving the problem. Most approaches to climate change are based in economics and environmental science; in this book, Parkash Chander argues that we can make further progress on the climate change impasse by considering a third approach—game theory.

Chander shows that a game-theoretic approach, which offers insight into the nature of interactions between sovereign countries behaving strategically and the kinds of outcomes such interactions produce, can illuminate how best to achieve international agreements in support of climate-change mitigation strategies. Game Theory and Climate Change develops a conceptual framework with which to analyze climate change as a strategic or dynamic game, bringing together cooperative and noncooperative game theory and providing practical analyses of international negotiations. Chander offers economic and game-theoretic interpretations of both the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement and argues that the Paris Agreement may succeed where the Kyoto Protocol failed. Finally, Chander discusses the policy recommendations his framework generates, including a global agreement to support development of cleaner technologies on a global scale.

Reviews

Written exceptionally clearly, this book lays out a novel theory of cooperative games and coalition formation as it applies to environmental problemsand in the process makes significant progress in reconciling cooperative and noncooperative game theory. -- Benjamin Ho, Vassar College Climate change is an extraordinarily challenging problem, partly because of its global commons nature. For this reason, game theory can bring valuable insights to considerations of alternative public policies, as well as to international negotiations among the countries of the world. In Game Theory and Climate Change, Parkash Chander adds in significant ways to the relevant scholarly literature at the interface of climate change, economics, and game theory. -- Robert N. Stavins, Harvard University In this important and timely book, Chander, a leading environmental economist and game theorist, systematically develops a set of game-theoretic solutions to the grand challenge of global climate change. He convincingly demonstrates the value of integrating insights from both cooperative and noncooperative games, and the importance of side payments in improving international climate agreements. He advances important solution concepts such as subgame perfect agreements and incorporates important real-world features, such as heterogeneity across nations. I strongly recommend the book to researchers as well as practitioners interested in international climate negotiations. -- Jinhua Zhao, Michigan State University The book will interest PhD students and game-theory experts. Recommended. * Choice * This is a timely book, interpreting climate change negotiations in terms of game theory concepts. The content of the book is based on a stream of papers published by the author over more than 20 years. The book is aimed at economists who use finely crafted mathematical models to explore possible solutions to complex social and environmental problems. The extensive bibliography will be helpful to any newcomer in the field of environmental economics. -- Alain B. Haurie * MathSciNet * Work like Chander's is important precisely because it creates tools we can use to imagine the distance between our world and one in which powerful actors have committed to a response to climate change. * H-Environment *

Preface xi
1 Purpose And Scope
1(16)
1.1 The Multidisciplinary Nature of Climate Change
2(15)
2 The Basic Framework
17(26)
2.1 Environment as an Economic Good
18(3)
2.2 Transfer Functions
21(5)
2.3 The Basic Model
26(17)
3 Rationale For Cooperation
43(24)
3.1 Equilibrium Concepts
44(5)
3.2 Efficiency and Cooperation
49(5)
3.3 The Rationale
54(13)
4 The Core Of A Strategic Game
67(36)
4.1 Strategic Games
69(8)
4.2 Coalitional Functions
77(11)
4.3 Partition Functions
88(5)
4.4 Noncooperative Foundations of the y-Core
93(10)
5 Environmental Games
103(32)
5.1 The Environmental Game
104(3)
5.2 The γ-Coalitional Function of the Environmental Game
107(5)
5.3 Nonemptiness of the γ-Core
112(3)
5.4 Some Specific γ-Core Imputations
115(9)
5.5 The γ-Core and the Coase Theorem
124(7)
5.6 The Seasonal Haze in Southeast Asia
131(4)
6 Coalition Formation Games
135(28)
6.1 Rationale for the Y-Core
137(11)
6.2 Extensions to n-Player Games
148(7)
6.3 Other Approaches to Coalition Formation
155(6)
6.4 Concluding Remarks
161(2)
7 Dynamic Environmental Games
163(44)
7.1 The Dynamic Model
165(9)
7.2 The Dynamic Environmental Game
174(1)
7.3 The Nash Equilibria of the Dynamic Environmental Game
175(7)
7.4 The Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium
182(8)
7.5 The Subgame-Perfect Cooperative Agreements
190(17)
8 Limits To Climate Change
207(26)
8.1 The Model
211(7)
8.2 Pollution Rights and Climate Change
218(5)
8.3 A Road Map for Stabilizing the Climate
223(10)
9 The Journey From Kyoto To Paris
233(40)
9.1 Main Features of the Kyoto Protocol
235(1)
9.2 A Model for Interpreting the Kyoto Protocol
236(5)
9.3 The Necessity of Transfers
241(16)
9.4 The Paris Agreement and the Road Ahead
257(11)
9.5 The Developing Countries and the Paris Agreement
268(5)
10 International Trade And Climate Change
273(18)
10.1 A Model with Two Consumption Goods
276(1)
10.2 International Trade in Goods
277(7)
10.3 International Trade in Both Goods and Emissions
284(3)
10.4 Environmental Agreements and International Trade in Goods
287(4)
Conclusion 291(8)
References 299(14)
Author Index 313(4)
Subject Index 317
Parkash Chander is professor of economics and executive director of the Center for Environmental Economics and Climate Change at the Jindal School of Government and Public Policy, O. P. Jindal Global University. He is a fellow of the Econometric Society and was formerly head of the Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi, and of the Department of Economics at the National University of Singapore.